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PREFACE 
The only solid base for a social program is reality. When it is 
built on foundations composed of what "should" be, the program begins 
in a perilous position. Community action programs ignored local po-
litical realities, commodity programs ignored what the p9or really eat, 
and the Legal Services Program of OEO ignored how the legal profession 
would react. It is the purpose of this thesis to help overcome some of 
this problem i.n the area of legal services by providing information 
. I 
about the environment in which it must function. By adding information 
about the small town to that previously gathered concerning urban and 
rural areas, the analysis of the environment becomes more complete. 
This should allow policymakers a better idea of which programs can work 
and which ones cannot. 
Many people deserve thanks for their help in preparing this thesis. 
Most specifically, thanks should go to my adviser Dr. Robert Spurrier, 
and my committee members Dr. Robert Darcy and Dr. James Lawler who have 
helped with the many problems along the way •. Equally important, but in 
a much different context, I wish to thank all my friends who were kind, 
considerate, and supportive throughout the project. Their kindness will 
not be forgotten. Legal Services Corporation also deserves credit for 
lwlping suJ»f,lY needed mat.erials. 
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CHAPTER I 
JUSTIFICATIONS AND NEED FOR CIVIL LEGAL AID 
Introduction 
In 191.9 Reginald Heber Smith publishedhis treatise Justice and 
the Poor and it quickly became a landmark in both legal aid literature 
and the legal aid movement. The te:Xt indicted the legal system as 
unfair to the poor because of procedural defects, one of which was the 
1 deHciency of low-cost legal counsel. To describe more graphically 
the effect the deficiency of l~gal ~ssistance had on the individuai, 
Smith used what he considered a "homely analogy." Describing the legal 
system as comparable to an automobile, Smith likened the law to the 
engine, the judge to the driving controls, and the lawyer to the gaso-
li.ne. lf identical cars were given to two men, but only one of the 
cars was filled with gasoline, i.t would be hard to imagine the ensuing 
race f . 2 a~r. 
Recognizing that the absence of the counsel of a lawyer renders 
trials ·unfair has led those interested in providing justice to an at-
tempt to cor.rect the problem. The attempts made include providing. 
lega1 assistance to those who cannot afford to pay--the pro bono ser-:-
vice of private lawyers. Most lawyers report that they perform some 
free service for the poor as a regular part of their private practice, 
considering it their. mbral and professional duty~ Dealing with civil 
1 
cases only~ the questions addressed by this paper will analyze the in-
centives for lawyers to perform such services, the characteristics ()f 
the environment that give rise to these incentives, and in what manner 
pro bono legal services may be integrated with the organized legal aid 
programs of the Leg'al Services Corporation. Without disputing a base 
2 
of altruistic.: motives underlying pro bono activities, it is hypothe-
sized that lawyers can and do use the activity to further personal-eco-. 
nomic goals. The significance of such an understanding lies not in 
normative terms, but in policy implications. By enlarging our under-
standing of the reasons that lawyers do pro bono service, the activity 
can be integrated more effectively into the organized legal aid programs 
of the Legal Services Corporation. 
Justifications f6r Civil Legal Aid 
Introduction 
More complex justifications for providing civil legal aid to the 
poor exi.st than the unfair race described by Reginald Heber Smith. 
Three _justIfications--due process, equal protection, and the adversary 
system--deal with rights and assurances of fairness in the legal system 
that call for the provision of free legal services for those who cannot 
afford it. Another justification points to the legal monopoly held by 
lawyers in the provision of legal services, and calls for free legal 
services for the poor as a method to repay this grant from soc.iety. 
Finally, and perhaps the major justification for legal aid as a benefit 
for the total society comes from its role in preserving order. By re-
so 1 vi.ng legal claims through the legal system, the country preserves· 
Jtrotection of its citizenry from anarchic extra legal and nonlegal. 
3 
solutions. l~nch of t:IU.'fl(·' Jtwt:lficat.lons carries with i.t ample reason 
f.or pt·ovidlng legal ser.v.icN~ to the poor. Combined they give over-
whelming reason for its installation as a right, not a privilege. 
The Due Process Clause 
. . 
The Due Process Clause ofthe 14th Amendment guarantees each citi-
zen that 1 ife, 1 iberty and property will not be denied without "du~ .. - · 
3 process" of law. Since the 1930s the Supreme Court has interpreted 
this provision as requiring free legal assistance for the poor in some 
4 
criminal case~ to ensure fairness. Basing their decision on the 
guarante(~S of the sixth amendment and the peculiarly coercive nature of 
<1 criminal trial, the Court ruled in Gideon v. Wainwright that legal 
. I 5 
counsel is "essential to a fair trial" in felony cases. Using the 
rationale found in Gideon, the Court expanded coverage of the protection 
to any time the accused stood a chance of being deprived of his liberty 
6 by a jail sentence regardless of its length. The extensions of the 
right to legal counsel show the Court's preoccupation with ensuring a 
fair criminal trial. By their logic, how can the right to legal as-
sistance be denied in civil trials when the same coercive power of 
state backs tl~ courts' decisions, and the defendants have no reason 
to be better prepared to conduct their own defense? 
One explanation for the reason that the Due Process Clause does 
not protect property as it does life and liberty is found in the Seventh 
Amendment to the Constitution. Dealing with the safeguards provided in 
civil cases, the founding fathers made no mention of a right to counsel. 
Advocates. of this view cite the right to counsel specifically granted 
in the Sixth Anlendment's protections of criminal procedures as showing 
4 
the founding fathers' intentions to limit guaranteed protection to this 
area. By 1789, England, from where the United States drew much of its 
legal heritage, provided legal counsel for indigents in civil cases as 
a matter of course. They did not, however, extend such rights to those 
facing the court systeni'under criminal charges. In some criminal cases 
legal counsel was not allowed regardless of the defendant's ability to 
7 pay. In England, the use of counsel was forbidden in treason trials· 
until 1837.8 The founding fathers could have intended the specific 
delegation of the right to counsel in criminal cases to be all the pro-
tection necessary, taking for granted its implied provision in civil 
cases. 
Another argument for provision of legal counsel to the poor only 
in criminal cases based its reasoning on the severity of possible 
punishment. Advocates explained that the degree of deprivation in 
civil cases cannot rival jail sentences or the death penalty, and 
therefore, do not warrant similar protection to ensure fairness. This 
ignores some civi.l proceedings which closely resemble criminal actions 
in the degree of deprivation possible. Examples of such fundamental 
civil interests include juvenile hearings, habeas corpus procedures, 
civil cormitments, and custody hearings. 9 The loss of such cases pro-
vide similar deprivations of liberty as would loss in a criminal case. 
The same inabilities that disadvantage a poor criminal defendant 
also disadvantage a poor civil defendant. They both must prove cotlt"" 
plex issues of legal proof, follow complicated legal procedures of 
which they may be ignorant, and show abilities in legal research beyond 
connon individual capacity in order to win their case. If they do not 
wi.n, losses may ensue si.milarly severe for both criminal and civil 
cases •. While criminal defendants are ensured counsel, civil litigants 
5 
zlrc· uul • ouc~ ult(1fnpt: l:o rc•c t·IJ y t:ld s •Uspnr tty t•.ame about wi.th the do-
v~Jopment of the Snmll Claims Court. This however has proven to be 
largely ineffective in protecting the poor civil litigant. Businessmen 
have used the court as a tool to improve collection of debts, while the 
poor have ignored it for reasons similar to their abilities in the regu~ 
lar courts. Studies have found the poor.to be ignorant of its exist-
to 
erice, its procedures, and its demands that legal proof be met. lf 
today's poor civil litigants wish to find free legal counsel, they must 
turn to other than the Due Process Cla~se to supply their needs. 
The Equal Protection Clause 
Another line of reasoning suggests the poor client's lack of coun-
sel may be a denial of the equal protection of the law--also guaranteed 
11 by the Fourteenth Amendment. Various Supreme Court decisions have 
supported such an accusation. In 1963 the Court stated that denial of 
a criminal appeal because the defendant could not afford the required 
trial transcript gave an unfair advantage in the legal system to tho~e 
12 
who could pay. The same year they also ruled that the right to coun-
sel must be provided to indigent criminal defendants making their first 
appeal. Without counsel they found the indigent's appeal to be a 
meaningless ritual qui.te unlike the appeals of those who could afford 
. 13 . 
counsel. Extending the equal protection safeguards even further, the 
Court again ruled in 1971 that an indigent criminal defendant cannot be 
denied trial records because only a fine, not a jail sentence, was in-
14 
volved. This was expressed as a "flat prohibition against pricing 
indigent defendants out of as effective an appeal as would be available 
15 to others able to pay their own way." Extension to civil cases fits 
the logic but bas never been made. 
6. 
Expansion of equal protection to indigents in court procedures was 
luemJH!rt.!d hy l.he i.nt·rNwl.ngly conservative mood of the Burger Court. 
One such limiting precedent refused to extend the indigent's right to 
counsel to a second discretionary appeal froma criminal conviction. 16 
Recently, the Court declined to require the right to counsel in a 
criminal case where a jail term or fines were statutorily available as 
punishment as long as the state realized it was then bound to issue ... 
1 f . 1 7 
. on y a : tne. Once again~ despite application in the criminal area, 
the Courts have stopped short of extending the right of legal counsel 
to civil litigants regardless of similarities between the two. 
Lawyers' Repayment for Grant of 
Monopoly 
One justification of legal services to the poor is based on an 
equal protection of all citi~ens, including indigents, but does not de-
pend on society to pay the costs. This argument shifts the burden onto 
the legal profession's shoulders as repayment for state-granted monopo-
lies over legal S<!rvices. Legal aid advocate John s. Bradway concluded 
Jn 1940 that the privilege of monopoly over legal services requires. 
lawyers to fulfill the obligation of the Constitutional gparantee of 
18 
equal protection for all clients regardless of their ability to. pay. 
The bar has not resisted such a burden,. especially when fulfilled 
by their own delivery methods and used to their own advantage. The 
bar's advocacy of legal aid increased during the Depression and shortly 
thereafter, :md may be considered to be a public relations effort. It 
was during this period that the economic condition of the bar indu~ed a 
program of e•rosecut ing laymen and agencies who practiced law without a 
7 
Jj cense. Their purpose was to keep as much scarce legal business in 
lawyers' hands as possible. Their enthusiasm went to the extent of 
banning the radio program, "The Good Will Court." Legal profession 
m<~mbers regarded this program as improper advertising of the relation-
I . 1 d h. 1' 19 s11ps .>etween attorneys an t e1r c 1ents .• Bradway described the 
public is reaction in the following quote: 
The public thereupon inquired what the organized bar, having 
thus announced its exclusive proprietary right to the field 
of law practice, was prepared to do for those clients who 
could not afford to pay a fee. The obvious answer was the 
legal aid society.20 
Thus the legal profession has made the trade of some free or low fee 
legal service for the poor in return for the economic benefit that they 
now enjoy. 
llistorically, little nonlegal competition has existed for the low 
f . 1 . 21 :ee pay1ng ~.lent. This may not always be the case, however. Advo-
cates of "de]awyer.izing" the law call for further development of Small 
Claims Courts to overcome their problems i.n helping the poor. As hap-
penNI in the case o ( property abstracts, removal of such simple tasks 
as uncontested divorces to nonlegal specialists has been suggested. 
This action could cut deeply into some lawyers' practices. Increased 
use of negotiation, conmunity courts, and ombudsmen are all suggested 
22 
and could further erode monopolistic advantages. Such threats to the 
moilopol is tic privilege may act as a challenge to the bar to provide 
more comprehensive service. 
The Adversary System 
A far simpler argument bases a need for legal aid in civil cases 
23 
on the deJnands of the adversary process. This practice of t·ruth 
8 
finding by combatants is based on the premise that "justice is the in-
evHablt~ composite.! effect of vigorous partisan interests, both in liti-
24 gation and in other law-developing processes." When the availability 
of legal services is not given to the poor, the moderate income, the 
minorities, or anyone, it raises doubts about the validity of the prem-
ises underlying this adversary system of justice. 25 
Breakdown in Legality 
One of the general purposes of a system based on laws and legal 
procedures is to provide a non-violent forum for·the redress of griev-
ances.. This fundamental premise helps a society to provide protection 
to its citizens--a major theoretical reason for the development of so-
ciety. For the system to provide such protection, it must be con-
sidered the proper manner in which to settle disputes, and also be 
considered accessible to all. If such is not the case, citizens resort 
1 1 h d h . f . . 26 to non ega met o s to ac.1eve a sense o JUSt1ce. Such anarchic 
systems lend little to the guarantee of protection to the citizens of 
. 27 
a society, and may lead to violence and political change. 
It is seen therefore, that ensured admission and faith in a legal 
system helps protect social stability ~~d social order. Both altruistic 
and self-interest motives can be derived from such a system. For the 
privileged, .it i.s a way to placate the underprivileged and stop left.;..· 
28 I Paning moV(!Otents which threaten ownership and wealthy interests. 
For the havenots, i.t represents a possibility of vindicating wrongs and 
equalizing strength with the assistance of powerful state machinery. 
9 
The Poor's Need for Legal Assistance 
An important issue in legal aid literature deals not with the 
justification for extending legal aid to the poor, but with the need 
for such services. The quest has provided researchers with particularly 
difficult problems. Methodological problems have included finding the 
poor, sponsoring a large-enough sample able to be generalized to the 
general public, and measuring a need that may be present but has gone 
unrecognized. An article dealing with such methodological problems is, 
"The Legal Needs of the Public--A Survey Analysis," by Preble Stoltz. 
This article pointed to strengths and weaknesses in many of the earlier 
.d . d 1 . . h i h i h f h . 1" d. 29 survey es1gns, an . ent 1ns1g t nto t e we g t o t e1r va 1 1t~. 
One specific area 
formation concerns the 
in which man,y recent stud1ies have provided in-
30 legal needs of the rural poor. Acknowledging 
that "the city has no monopoly on wickedness, and evil hearts are to 
be found 'far from the maddening crowd'," writers have attempted to 
31 bring this special need to light. This trend acted as an impetus to 
bring legal services to rural areas, where previously they had only 
32 been available in urban centers. 
Regardless of extension of services, the primary question of the 
poor's legal needs stil.l remains to be answered. To date, a study 
group headed by Barbara Curran has provided the most authoritative 
data available. From October, 1973, to March, 1974, they conducted 
interviews using a National Opinion Research Center (NORC) multistage 
probability sample. They limited the universe from which they choose 
their sample to Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas and contiguous 
counties within the continental United States. The major problem of 
10 
this study, however, was its small sample size. The team surveyed only 
33 
one hundred households, thus raising some question to the sample's 
ability to be generalized to the population. Also, the problem of un-
recognized legal need may mask the findings, making them seem weaker 
than they are. Although the study of the Curran figures showed higher 
use of lawyers to incidences-of-need ratios for low income groups in 
some,areas such as torts and juvenile-related matters, the expected 
trend for the lower-income group to follow the higher-income group in 
34 incidence/use ratios was generally the.case. 
Probably the most convincing argument in keeping with the pre-
vJously mentioned justifications for legal services emerged from an 
analysis of the Curran study by Yakov Avichai. 35 Developing a model to 
I 
determine the number of legal problems faced by all respondents as a 
function of age and generation, Avichai fit the variable data to a least 
squares line. The closeness of fit of his equation was eviden~ed by an 
R2 of .97,. or in other words, by explaining 97% of the variance. 36 
The results showed an accelerated number of problems encountered 
over the last fifty years by those in the Curran sample. Speculative 
reasons for this trend included an increase in awareness of the law and 
··~ changing society that has increa~ed greatly the exposure of ordinary 
citizens to legnl problems. Examples of such changes in~ltided a con-
surner problem increase because of greater affluence and more easily 
available credit, a real property acquisitions increase as a result of 
greater mobility and affluence, and a divorce and alimony problem in-
crease because of changing social attitudes. 37 
One relevant area of analysis showed the mean expected age for a 
person to encounter his or h~r first legal problem decreased from 21.8 
------
------
11 
· ~ 1Q~ 1 d 1. 1).2 :l.n· 1.97~. 38 Ad )'(c•ar~; :lu 19:)3, to l'J., yt•ar!: in .. ):J, IHI'. > ecreasing 
Jll(!an <lge for acquisition of real property may partially explain such an 
increase in lower age groups facing legal problems. From 1951 to 1960 
the mean age for first acquisitions was 33.8 years. From 1971 to 1974, 
. . 39 
the mean age dropped to 29.6 years. Furthermore, the trend showed 
that each succeeding generation acquired more property. 40 This increase 
in ownership coupled with another evidenced trend, a dramatic increase 
in property damage or theft for all ages, was seen to cause even more 
legal problems. The rate of incidence for damage and theft almost 
doubled from the 1950s to the 1970s. 41 
In light of such increases in real property, divorce, and consumer 
affairs problems, one would be hard pressed to develop a scenario where 
42 the poor had no legal counsel needs in civil cases. Such a need will 
be taken as a given for the purposes of this paper, without further ex-
planation into the exact degree of l~gal need which exists. Research-
ing this answers a different policy question than the one to which this 
paper is directed. 
Conclusion 
Examination of.justifications and need for free legal services was 
intended to give the reader a theoretical background on which further 
·analysis may build. The summary of United States legal aid development. 
in Chapter II should help broaden this base of understanding, and pro-
vide the background.needed to analyze lawyers' incentives for pro bono 
service in civil cases. 
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CHAPTER II 
COMMON AND EXPERIMENTAL LEGAL SERVICES 
DELIVERY SYSTEMS 
Introduction 
Once the need for free legal assistance is recognized, the manner 
in which the se rv .ice t.s dtd ivered is next considered. Until recently, 
lawyers lwve used three major types of delivery systems. These common 
typ~s are pro bono service, lawyer referral service, and organized legal 
aid service. The term organized refers to services developed solely to 
provide legal aid to the poor. Other service types are considered un-
organized when private attorneys provide legal aid irt addition to their 
regular business. Pro bono and lawyer-referral are both considered un-
organized forms of service, with lawyer referral being a variation of 
pro bono service. 
ln addi.t ion to the common service de livery systems, the Legal Ser-
vices Cqrporalion is testing the effectiveness of innovative new de-
l i.very systems. These Demonstration Projects are evaluating the merits 
of judicare programs, contract programs, prepaid and group tnsurance 
programs, voucher programs, and integrated pro bono programs. 1 Each 
program will be described later in the chapter. 
Each type of service delivery system has various strengths and 
weaknesses which are important to evaluate. The merits of each system 
will be analyzed to determine how much and what types of services can 
15 
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be provided to the poor; as well as the consistency that the service 
can be expected to maintain. This chapter will provide the reader with 
a comparative understanding of the major delivery systems. With this 
background, the analysis of actors within the pro bono delivery system 
will provide a greater understanding of the overall situation. 
The Three Most Common Delivery Systems 
Pro Bono Services 
Under the pro bono system, the indigent client comes directly to 
the private attorney's office for legal service. Each attorney de-
termines his own eligibility criteria for this service at a reduced fee 
or completE~ly free. Since there is no advertisihg of this service, the 
client may IHlVt! dlscovered its existence in one of several ways. Vari-
ous groups in the community act as intermediaries, bringing together the 
poor client and the willing lawyer. Persons who perform this role in-
elude social welfare workers, friends and relatives of the lawyer, the 
lawyer's paying clients, and indigent clients who previously have gone 
2 to the lawyer for such assistance. The intermediary and the indigent 
client usually make contact when the client comes to the intermediary 
for help with a problem. Intermediaries recognize these problems as 
legal and refer the indigent to a lawyer they think may help. On oc-
casi.ons they may contact the lawyer themselves on behalf of the client. 
Such intermediaries often know the attorney personally through profes-
3 
sional or social contacts. The most conmon relationships between the 
intermediary and indigent client are the employer/supervisor and em-
4 ployee contact, or the friend and relative contact. 
Meri.ts of pro bono services include its simplicity and its low 
cost. No additional administrative oversights or costs are involved. 
The lawyers'. concern for maintaining a good reputation helps to keep 
the quality of service acceptable. The greatest merit of the. service 
17 
lies in providing services for complaints common to their regular prac-
tice.· This is especially true when the complaints can be resolved by 
advice, negotiation, and by less time-consuming activities such as un-
contHsted divorces. 5 Such divorces may easily "be slipped in with the 
other divorces he [the lawyer] planned to do anyway."6 
Another merit of pro bono service, as seen by the lawyers, is that 
the service provides help to the poor without government involvemen~. 7 
As a;professional part of the captalist superstructure, lawyers' fears 
of goV£~rnment interference center ·around two major areas. First, many 
lawyers fear socialized law. They contend this would lower the quality 
of service as well as the profits gathered. Lowering of profits might 
further lower quality by causing the profession to fail to attract the 
highest qualified students. 8 They also contend that government con-
trolled legal services encourage litigation in already overcrowded 
9 
courts. 
The bar also finds merit in pro bono services in that they can be 
an outlet for public relations work. From the New Testament 1 s chastise-
ment "Woe unto you also, ye lawyers, for ye lade men with burdens griev-, 
ious to be borne, and ye yourselves touch not the burdens with one of 
your fingers,"lO to Shakespeare's quote, "The first thing we do, let's 
kill all the lawycrs,•• 11 we see a trend in literature to cast the 
lawyf!T as the villain. Furthermore, on a scale of honesty and ethical 
standards, 25 percent of the American public ranked lawyers above 
18 
average, 48 percent ranked them as average, and 26 percent ranked them 
as below average. However, for those with income less .than $3,000, 
only 18 percent found lawyers above average; 48 percent as average, and 
35 percent ranked them below average. These were the lowest rankings 
given by any subgroup of the population. 12 Any outlet for public rela-
tions work can h~lp the profession, but legal aid also acts as a justi-
fication for their state-granted monopoly over legal services. 
Although the merits of pro bono services make the delivery system 
appealing, it is less effecti.ve when used as the only type of available 
free legal service. The greatest limitation of pro bono delivery is 
13 
·its economic dependence on private lawyers. One lawyer best described 
this weakness by saying, 
Once a lawyer gets out of school and hangs up that shingle, 
it is th~ paying clients that walk through the door that pay 
his salary and pay for things like the building and the 
· e lee trici l:y .14 
Another lawyer furthered this point by acknowledging the limits in the 
amount: of pro bono service self-employed lawyers .can provide. He ex-
plai.ned; 
If too many poor flood through the doors, eventually there 
will have to be a stopping place, and some would be turned 
away with nowhere to turn [if no organized legal aid pro-
gram exists in the communty].l5 · 
l\<~siden the 1 imit in tot<tl numbers able to be ~ssisted, a limit 
also exists on the types of servites available. Thus, they are in-
clined to specialize in the types of cases that will provide them with 
. 17 
the best income. This specialization of legal practices has led to 
the institutionalization of some areas of the law. lnstitutionaliza-
tion d(•scrihes the process of problems repeatedly making their way to 
an attorney. When such problems come regularly enough, the' lawyers 
19 
and the gtmeral public begin to define such situations as legal prob-
l~mo. For example, sexual discrimination depends upon attitudes and 
. f ti. f i. i f i . di . i . 18 1n:orma on or v ew ng una r pract1ces as scr1m nat1on. Since 
the type of problem, income, and location in the social structure af-
feet contacts with lawyers, institutionalization of the problems of the 
poor seldom·occur, leaving many such problems undefined. 19 This line 
of reas~ming prompted Leon Mayhew to write, "The poor have fewer legal 
problems only in the narrow sense that they have fewer problems that 
20 the legal profession habitually serves." Therefore, unless a program 
renders poverty cases lucrative enough to encourage specialization; un-
less it is recognized by the poor often enough to become institution-
21 
alized, private lawyers will deal with few poverty related issues. 
Another limitation of pro bono services is the propensity for 
lawyers to dispose of poverty cases in the most expedient manner pos-
sible. In a survey by Phillip Lochner, the attorneys queried were vir-
tually unanimous in admitting they spent less time on low fee and no 
22 fee cases than on the problems of paying clients. They also ac-
knowledged a disinclination to take very difficult or highly complex 
23 
cases. According to the lawyers, they spent little time on legal re-
24 
search, and much more on advice and negotiation. 
h d k f 1 . . 1 25 survey . a ta en a case o . a poor c 1ent to tr1a • 
No lawyer in the 
Such concern with 
expedienc~ hampers the lawyer's ability to provide meaningful services 
to poor, civil ligitants. 
A final li.mitation involves the consistency of availability of 
these services to the poor. Based on the economic condition of the 
bar, the poor may be turned away from a pro bono system in times of fi-
nam~i~d crisis. The Great Depression caused such a reduction, as 
20 
l1•wy(•r':> 1wrvlcPf: wPn· mw ol lht~ I Ir::l budget <:uts made hy families 
26 
trimming t~xpenses. During World War II some lawyers left the profes-
sion, taking jobs in defense plants or emergency government agencies to 
. 27 . 
surv1ve. Once the poor are guaranteed legal services, and come to 
expect them as a matter of right, such reductions could provoke the 
poor :into nonlegal alternatives or radical measures. This, once again, 
threate~s the stability of the society ~nd its ability to provide pro-
tection to its people. This is perhaps the most serious limitation to 
legal services provided by a pro l>ono delivery.system. 
Lawyer Referral 
In 1<}37 .John S. Bradway noted, "The History of legal aid has defi-
1 
nately indicated that progress is made during those periods when rna:-
. 28 
chinery Hxists for encouraging thought and action." In that same 
year one such development occurred--the development of the lawyer re-
Eerral service. A system for delivery of legal services to the needy 
first appeared in Los Angeles in 1937. The same year the American Bar 
Association appointed a special Committee on Legal Clinics to investi-
29 gate their usefulness and compatability with the bar. Although this 
30 growth was caused to some extent by the needs of the Depression,·· the 
programs that developed made little headway in the extension of ser-
31 
vices to the poor for almost a decade. Lawyers in favor of the sys-
tern stressed the practical as opposed to the ethical value of their 
s(!rvice. They were not interested in simply providing equal justice. 
Instead they pointed first to.their ability to keep people off telief 
rolls by getting back salaries or support as one of the merits of the 
program. Secondly, ·they noted lawyer referral's ability to ~ducate 
21 
1wop I<' who had never be fore US(~d a lawyer's services concerning the 
value and necessity of such services. Third, they pointed to the fact 
that lawyer referral let younger bar members get vah,table experience 
in dealing with clients. Finally, they acknowledged the contribution 
to the legal profession that lawyer referral performed by building the 
b) . 1 . . f h. b . h h 1 bl" 32 pu .. 1c re at 1.ons 1.mage o t e ar w1. t t e genera pu 1.c. 
In 1950, however, the social impetus for progress that Bradwayhad 
discussed a decade earlier came to the lawyer referral movement• In 
that year, Great Britain established the "Legal Aid and Advice Scheme." 
This Scheme provided a governmentally operated system to bring legal 
services to the British poor. Coming in the midst of Wisconsin Senator 
Joseph McCarthy's fight against "creeping social,ism," the threat of 
I 
government-controlled legal services led to the bar's mobilization to 
. d . 33 protect 1.ts veste 1nterests. In 1949, 43 percent of large United 
States cities were without any form of legal aid society, but by 1959 
34 the percentage had been reduced drastically to only 21 percent. 
The basic lawyer referral service consists of a central·office 
manned by a receptionist. The receptionist, often a qualified para-
legal, establishes the client's eligibility based on local Bar Asso-
elation criteria. Once ellgibi.lity is determined, the client is sent 
to a willing lawyer's private office. The lawyer has previously agreed 
to see the client on this first visit for free or for a low, pre-set 
fee made known to the client by the lawyer-referral receptionist. From 
thi.s point, client ilnd attorney negotiate what services will be per-
35 formed and what fee, i.f any, will be charged. 
The most important advantage of this system is its flexibility. It 
cane;u;ily be adopted to almost any budget;. making it a particularly 
22 
appealing alternative to pro bono services for the smaller town. Pos-
sible referral structures include a full-time referral office, a Bar 
Association office, or even an answering service to make appointmertts 
36 
with lawyers in a prearranged order. 
Another merit found in the lawyer referral service as opposed to 
simple pro bono is the greater possibility of matching the client's 
problem with the lawyer's capability. Lists of cooperating lawyers 
may be categorized by field of specialization. Rotatiort of the lawyers 
then protects any from being over-burdened by low fee or no fee 
1 . 37 c 1cnts. A lesser likelihood of the poor being turned away exists 
when the responsibilities are better dispersed among the legal com-
munity. tts ability to reach the poor for the first time was re-
corded by George G. Gallantz. He found that "as many as 80 to 90 
percent of those who take advantage of lawyer referral have never be-
fore consulted a lawyer.'' These figur~s describe those of moderate 
means, coming to the lawyer for low fee work, not for free service 
. h . d" . 38 g1ven to t e 1n 1gent. This can be seen as a step forward for the 
legal aid movement since these people are often too wealthy to quality 
for organized legal aid services, but too poor to be able to pay a 
private lawyer his normal fee. 
One advantage the lawyer referral service has over the pro bono 
system for the participating lawyer is the referrer. In a fully 
equipped referral service this referrer is the person in charge of 
referrals. He or she often screens applicants before sending them to 
the attorney. Tf qualified as a paralegal, the referrer can save the 
attorney even more time by dealing with the minor probiems requiring 
only sound advice. This arrangement alsoweeds out problems not legal 
in nature, sending them to social agencies or others for appropriate 
assistance. 39 Finally, just as in the pro bono service, the lawyer 
23 
ref err a 1 service acts as a public relations measure. It helps to "put 
· the Bar in a new light before the many citizens who think of lawyers 
as selfish and self-centered, and who regard the law as the most un-
. 40 
popular.of professions." 
The limitations on the lawyer referral services are basically·the 
same as those for pro bono services. Once again, the legal assistance 
to the poor is based on the economic fortunes of private attorneys. 
Furthermore, the problems of practice specialization and legal 
problem institutionalization are the same for both service delivery . 
types. This is primarily caused by the weakness of the referral office. 
The lawyer referral system parallels a confederal form of government 
in structure, with lawyers retaining the authority over decisions on 
what cases to take and what services to provide. 
One, further limitation, thou~h seemingly minor, may also effect 
client usage. The lawyer referral system with a manned office requires 
the poor client to first establish eligibility there, and then contact 
<~ lawyer in his private office at a later date. For the working poor 
this requires missing time from their job twice and may act as a de-
41 terent. 
Organized Legal Services 
The definitive characteristic of organized legal services is 
purpose. Unorganized legal services rely on private lawyers to con-
tribute time from their major purpose of running a private practice. 
On the other hand, organized legal services rely on lawyers working 
24 
directly for the legal aid offices, with their major purpose being de-
livery of i.ree legal services to the indigent. A brief summary of or-
ganized legal Bid history follows. 
When in 1976 the United States celebrated its 200th birthday, the 
legal aid movement celebrated its one-hundredth. Founded in New York 
City in 1876 by the German Society, Der Deutcsher Rechts-Schutz Verein 
was seen as a response to the large German immigration following the 
Civi 1 War. The soc.it>ty existed to protect these immigrants from· "the 
r~pacity nf runners, boarding house keepers and a miscellaneous coterie 
42 
o[ slwrpers." Under the leadership of Arthur V. Briesen, the or-
gani z<tt ion removed tht• qualification of German birth in 1890. This 
action caused the German Society to withdraw their support, but com-
1 
munity charities of. a wider interest offered more support than ever 
. 43 he fore. 
44 Turning to the New York service as a guideline for development, 
leg[tl services spread until by 1910 organized legal aid work was 
reasonably well established in all larger eastern cities. 45 Since es-
tahl ishment. of legal aid was considered a local concern, little was 
I b (. 1 t\ 1 1 • 1 1 i . . 11 46 tone e:orc ~ . to organ1ze .ega serv ces nat1ona. y. In this 
year, representatives from fourteen local societies met inPittsburg, 
Pennsylvariia, for the first national conference on legal aid activi-
t.i<>s. Th<> fo11owjnp, yPar they established a loose confederation known 
as thf! N<~lional Alliance of l~egal Aid Societies. This group's purpose 
was to bring about cooperation, increased interest in their work, and 
I f . . f . . . 47 t1e ormat1on o. new soc1et1es. 
After the establishment of the National Alliance, developm~nt of 
legal aid startPd its slow movement west. The period from 1910-1913 
48 In I hr• m I d-wl~ fl t.:. . From 1914 to 1918 the idea spread 
2.5 
a I oug the Pac- if I c Coast and into the Southwest unt i 1 almost all major 
cit i.es in the United States had an established legal aid organiza-
. 49 
tlOTI. 
World War l caused a drop in legal aid interest, but this drop 
was made up for when Reginald Heber Smith's treatise, Justice and the 
Poor was published. His book provided the "necessary impetus for a 
50 
new start.'' Justice and the Poor was credited with leading the 
American Bar Association to form a Special Committee on Legal Aid in 
1920, as well as inspiring the formation of the National Association 
of Legal Aid Organizations in 1923. 51 This association was a reorgani-
zation of the older National Alliance of Legal Aid Societies. 52 The 
I 
reorganized group saw :its main purposes as striving for better internal 
administration of societies, forming a central body to promote guidance 
in handling recurring types of cases, and in promoting public relations 
l I f . i 53 to encourage t 1e growt 1 o new soc1et es. 
Other than a third reorganization of the above mentioned organi-
. I N . l I 1 A . d A ' • 54 d h d 1 f zat 1011 r:o t w att.mw .eg<t 1 ssoc1at1on, an t e eve opment o 
1 he lawy('r referral ::wrvice previously mentioned, little progress was 
made in legal aid until 1965. 
With the beginning of the War on Poverty, legal aid in the United 
States took on a new character. Congress established the Office of 
l•:conomi.c Opportunity (OEO) Jn 1964, with its major goal being "to 
55 
eljndnate the paradox of poverty in the mi.dst of plenty." Although 
th(.~ Leg;JI. Services Program was not a part of the 1964 Act, it quickly 
1 f d . . i d . . 56 came about as a resu .t o a m1n1strat ve ec1s1ons. The program 
might nc!Vf~r have come into existence, however, if it had not been for 
26 
the work of current Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, then serving·as 
Amer"ican Dar Association President, in garnering the Association's 
57 
support for the matter. 
Diverging from past legal services methods, the Legal Services 
Program of the OEO was designed to provide legal service in five areas: 
1) client service, 2) law reform, 3) community education, 4) group 
58 
representation, and 5) economic development. Backup centers were de-, 
v1~loped to specialize in mnjor areas of poverty law includi~g such 
59 
are;,!; as housing, W('lfare; consumer educati.on, and health. , 
Regardless of the assistance that the Legal Services Program gave , 
1 d bl 60 i' • h to the poor in overcoming poverty-reate pro ems, oppos.tton tote 
program began to grow when in 1967 it became apparent the organization's. 
national policy was to he law ~eform through the use of test cases and 
1 . • 61 c ass actton su1ts. Almost all debate focused on the bre~king away 
I 
from a one-to-one client relationship and moving to test ca~es and 
' 
class action suits as a means to challenge both private and 1 public 
i nst itul .ions' pol i c i. es. 62 
Congressional subcommittees were further rattled by contentions 
tlwt poverty personnel contributed to social unrest and precipitated 
riots in some cities. 63 One example of such activity occurred in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, in March of 1967 when OEO funded Vista workers passed out 
handbills reading! 
You are Negroes, not Tulsans. South side children play in 
beautiful parks, while Negro children play in streets. Does 
City Hall care? No parks, no movies, no recreation at all. 
Funny thing about North ~ulsa, there's nothing for Negroes, 
nothing for riobody, just nothing • • .64 
That such actlv i ty provt!d to be inflammatory is an understatement. It 
was such activity, rt~g:ndless of its purpose, that gave almost all OEO 
27 
programs a bad name with establishment officials nationwide. 
The OEO's sponsorship of legal aid ended in July of 1974 when all 
. 
responsibilities were transferred to the newly established Legal Ser-
i C .. 65 v ces orporat1on. 
A simple definition provided by the Corporation describes itself 
as a "private, non-profit organization established by Congress in 1974 
(PL 93-355) to provide support for legal assistance to the poor in · 
. . 1 . 1166 c lVL matters. 
Headed.by an eleven member board of directors, the Corporation's 
major responsibility is to ensure that its grantees provide 'services 
effectively and efficiently, and comply with the rules and ~egulations 
67 
of the Corporation and i.ts enabling legislation. Nine regional of,... 
! 
fices have been established through which the Corporation d~rectly 
I· , . • ! 
68 
supervises these grantees. The individual program grantees, however, 
have a wide range of flexibility within Legal Services Corporation 
guidelines. Each program is governed by its own board of directors, 
69 
which includes both lawyers and eligible clients. Although each pro-
gram conducts its operations within the general guidelines of the 
Corporation's regulations and policies, they have broad authority with-
in these limits to determine what emphasis their program will under-
70 take. 
To <Jssist the local programs, the Corporation was charged with the 
devel.opment of Support Centers and a Research Institute. The Support 
Centers help program Jawyers with complex legal problems, especially 
71 those dealing with poverty law areas. The Research Institute under-
takes study projects involving a broad range of legal problems directly 
71 
relating to services performed by local service programs. Combined, 
28 
the two services attempt to find better ways to ensure civil legal ser-
vices for the poor. 
The advantages of the organized legal services programs such as 
the Legal Services Corporation rest largely :in their economic inde-
pendence from the private legal profession. Less disruption of ser-
vices should be felt during times of economic downswings under such a 
system. In fact, the potential exists for more services being ext,ended 
in such periods because of lawyers finding salaried jobs with the Cor-
poration programs more lucrative than their private practice. 
Another easily recognizable advantage is the ability of this type 
delivery system to speci~li~e in poverty law matters because of govern-
mental funding. Hefore government support was ayailable, specializa..:. 
lion in poverty issues was imp~actical for lawyers dependent; on profits. 
Similarly, since institutionalization of issues as leg~l problems 
is.caused by the frequency with which such claims are brought, new areas 
of problems faced by the poor should be increasingly recogni:zed as legal 
73 problems. 
f•'urther advantages of the Legal Services Corporation specifically 
can be seen in Congress' attempt to avoid the political activities and 
resultant conservative backlash encountered by the OEO Legal Services 
·. 74 Program. ny th(• Legal Services Corporation Act, employees of the 
Corporation are forbidden to engage in or encourage demonstrations, 
picketings, boycott strikes, rioting, violations of an outstanding 
injunction from any court, or any other illegal activity. This in-
. . . 75 
eludes official idcntlfi.cation with anyone performing such activities. 
Heyond tl1is, they are to refrain from taking any case that can possibly 
lw fee-generating; from lobbying unless for a specific client or 
29 
reqw~sted hy the gov(•rmnent; <tnd from furthering initiatives, refere.n-
11 h . 76 dums, and reca s. wit Corporation money. To ensure a more tra-
ditional approach to legal services, no class action suits, appeals, or 
anicus curiae briefs may be undertaken without express approval of a 
local project director, according to policies established by the local 
. b d 77 govern1ng oar • Finally, no connection is to be made by program 
1 • h • li . 1. • • • 78 awyers w1t any part1san po t1ca act1v1t1es. Although many of 
these provisions slow the advances possible in the poverty law area, 
they also :tllow the service to work compatably with the established 
soci;ll interests. This has helped to avoid the political antagonism 
felt by OEO's Legal Services Programs. 
Limitations on go~ernment supported legal services are derived 
primarily from its financial dependence on Congress. Since the Legal 
I 
Services Corporation does not represent a strong economic interest, it 
must necessarily take a second place in a politically-oriented Con-
gress. If :Increased support by the legal profession could be en-
couraged, this limitation might be lessened. Corporation researchers 
are presently studying the extent to which legal services should be 
governmentally financed, and the extent to which the private bar should 
79 provide non-subsidized legal services. A program providing realistic 
incenti.ves to private lawyers might both gather support in Congress and 
provide increasing pro bono activity for the lower income group. 
A final limi.tation of the present organized delivery system is 
their reluctanceto advertise because of budgetary restraints •. In some 
ar<~as, programs could not handle the increased turnout that might be 
c:wsed by massive 11dvertisement campaigns, since heavy turnout might 
cause long waits and $trains to the project's capacity. As was 
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previously IIKmtiom!d, once individuals are ronde aware of their right.s, 
indigation and nonlegal solutions to newly perceived problems might 
follow. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the history, structural characteristics, 
advantages, and disadvantages of the three.most common service delivery 
typ.es--pro hono delivery, lawyer referral delivery, and organized legal 
services delivery. Now a brief discussion of the major experimental 
delivery types wiJ 1 be undertaken. Systems discussed will include those 
currently bei.ng tested by the Legal Services Corporation as suggested 
alternatives t.or the more common methods. 
Experimental Delivery Systems 
Judicare 
Similar to the governmentally sponsored Medicare program, Judicare 
provides for the paying ot private attorneys for providing certain legal 
services to the poor. Fees for such services are determined either on 
an hourly rate or as a set fee for a particular type of service. 
GcnerHlly this r<1t.<• or fee charged is below the normal fees charged by 
the partici.p:tt:ing lawy(•r. After client eligibility is determined at a 
c(•nlral legal aid ;H.Iminist.r.ati.ve office,· the staff sends clients to 
participating lawyers with proof of eligibility. The lawyer performs 
the necessary service and bills the administrative office of the local 
I. . 80 program or compens<ltt.on. 
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Contract Legal Services 
Under this method of service delivery, contracts are made with 
private attorneys who have agreed to handle a small number of cases re-
ferred to them by a program office. This distinguishes the sys.tem 
from Judicare hy obligating willing lawyers to take a certain number 
of cases per year. The program reimburses the attorney for services 
to eligible clients by either a set rate per hour or a set fee, usually 
81 
at a lower rate than for the lawyer's private practice. 
Prepaid and Group Legal Insurance 
Used as a supplement to organized legal services, this delivery 
system provides simpler, more rootine services SlJCh as advice and 
simple document work. Fees charged to members are generally lower than 
those normally charged to private clients. Underwritten by insurance 
companies, the government pays a premium for each eligible client in 
the program. When and if services are needed by a client, the lawyer 
who performs them bills the insurance company for compensation. This 
is quite similar to the procedure involved in insuring auto repairs. 
Administration of such a program, including eligibility determinations, 
can be carried out through the organized legal services local program 
82 
·office. 
Vouchers 
This method of legal aid delivery attempts to insure quality of 
services to the dient by supplying him or her with a choice of lawyers. 
Eligible clients are given a choice of service from a local program 
staff lawyer or from the cooperating private lawyer of his choice. The 
32 
parlicipating lawyers draw up an appropriate fee schedule for specific 
types of legal work. If the client chooses a private attorney, a 
voucher is made out in a predetermined amount depending on the staff 
office interpretation of the legal problem involved. The client then 
takes the .voucher to the participating lawyer and receives the service 
called for on the voucher. For cost-overruns that are unavoidable, the 
attorney may request additional compensation if approved by the project 
director. 83 
Pro Bono Integration With Government 
Funded Referral Offices 
Similar to lawyer referral in almost every characteristic, the 
1 
major distinction in this plan resides in its governmental funding of 
the referral office. A similar referrer determines eligibility and re-
fers the client to one of the program's unpaid participating lawyers. 
The client then travels to the attorney's private office for legal ser-
vice. The referral office generally tries to get as many lawyers as 
possible to participate. This helps keep down the number of cases for 
which each attorney .is asked to pledge service. Since an appointment 
with the lawyer is required, and a considerable wait may ensue, a·staff 
Conclusion 
De livery systems, both common and experimental, have been exaained 
in this chapter. Institutional structures provide an understanding of 
th<~ advantages and the li.mitations of each delivery system in its 
33 
ability to bring legal services to the poor. An understanding of the 
unorganized delivery structures and their alternatives will facilitate 
understanding of the incentives for lawyers to perform such services. 
This is the topic of Ch~pter III. 
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CHAPTER III 
TUE J.:CONOMIC AND ROLE EXPECTATION INCENTIVES. FOR 
PERFORMING UNORGANIZED LEGAL AID SERVICE 
Introduction 
As was discussed in Chapter II, unorganized legal services are de-
l j>endent upon the economic situations of private lawyers.· In his book, 
!low to Go Directly Into Solo Law Practice (Without Missing a Meal), 
Gerald M. Singer said quite apHy, "You must be more than just a good 
. 2 . lawyer, you must get paid." Since the.lawyer is a self-employed 
businessman who must be concerned with.profit, this leads to speciali-
zation in areas he or she expects to be lucrative. Institutionaliza-
tion of these more lucrative-type legal problems then occurs. As it 
was previously described, institutionalization is the process by which 
problems colll'llOnly brought to lawyers come to be defined throughout so-
ciety as legal problems. Since in civil cases lawyers have often 
specialized in business and property matters, these and related areas 
have become generally considered areaswhere a person needs a lawyer 
3 to resolv£! problems. This has not been the case with many of the less 
lucrative problems faced by the poor. Housing problems, cons&aer 
ctedlt problems, and administrative agency proble•s have not been 
simllarly institutionalized. 4 They have, in effect, been priced out· 
s 
of an open-market system in which they cannot coapete effectively. 
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1\ec:.ause t"helr problems have:' not been institutionalized, and be-
cause they have not been competitors in an open-market, the legal 
services lawyers have offered the poor generally have been simple ser-
vices, quickly performed. Lawyers put less time into researching the 
no fee and 1owfce cases they received. They were not found to be in-
clined to take very difficult or highly complex cases on such a basis. 
Resolution of the pro bono case rarely was seen to involve the insti.-
tution of any legal action, and more rarely still did such a case go 
. I 6 to trta .• Instead lawyers preferred resolution of the problem through 
. 7 
advice and negotiation. It should be noted however, such simple ser-
vices have appeared to be sufficient in many situations. For many poor 
clients, the problem resolved itself when the opponent learned the poor 
client had been properly advised. A few words from a lawyer have 
helped protect the client from the unwarranted threats of the opposing 
8 party. Unorganized legal services programs perform best under such 
circumstances. 
The number of Jndi.gent clients served by lawyers has also been 
limited by economics. Lawyers have acknowledged turning away poor 
1 f . 9 c ients or econom1.c reasons. In general, however, lawyers have . 
seemed willing to perform pro bono work for the poor as a public ser-
vice. The motivations behind the performance of this public service 
h<1ve been seen previously to include justifying their monopolistic 
10 grmtt over h•gR 1 servlces, and in improving the profession's public 
1 . 11 re at1.ons. 
Based on this background, and in keeping with the common economics 
of .a pdvatt~ business, itt<.~entives t>xist to maximize. returns on no-fee 
and low fee work if possible. In the legal business, the most rewarding 
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returns to lawyers seem to be help in building and maintaining their 
practices, and help in fulfilling their role expectations in the com-
munity. Each of these hypothesized incentives for doing no-fee and 
low fee work deserve detailed examination. 
Building a Practice and Fulfilling Social 
Expectations as Incentives for Services 
Building or Maintaining a Law 
Practice 
First, to achieve his or her profit goals as a self-employed 
businessman, a lawyer must build and maintain a·steady traffic of 
clients. J>hi.ll ip Lochner researched this area in a survey of lawyers 
i.n and surrounding Buffalo, New York. He found that of those who re-
sponded to the question, 41, or 66 percen.t of solo practioners; and 
36, or 67''t. of the firm partners described their primary mbtives for 
12 taking most no fee and low fee cases was to help their practice. 
This he found to be especially true for the lawyer trying to establish 
:1 practice. These lawyers reported serving no-fee and low fee clients 
with the hope that someday they might become grateful paying ·clients •. 
Lochner noted, "'J.'oday' s impoverished unmarried graduate student, after 
all, might well turn out to be tomorrow's solidly middle-class univer-
sity faculty member and family man with taxes to be paid, wills to be 
13 
wrHten and homes to be purchased." Stephen Gillers, author of ~ 
Rather Do lt Myself: How to Set Up Your OWn Law Firm, also found this 
to be the case. Ue said, "My experience has been that an active 
i.nterest in pro bono work helps get your naiiC around and, in some in-
. 14 
t!XJ)Hc:able and indirect way, leads to work." Another similar 
42 
incentive noted by young attorneys was that the case might generate 
f hl hli i l Jd ] . 15 :tvora e pu c ty ttat wou. attract c .1ents. Finally, the lawyers 
explained that what at first appeared to be a no fee or low fee case 
sometimes deve:top(~d into a paying case on a contingent fee basis when 
16 
all the facts wt•re known. 
lf younger lawyers use no fee and low fee cases to build a prac-
ticc, then what im:entives exist for more establ i.shed lawyers to perform 
such services? Older lawyers reported finding pro bono service as .a way 
to maintain their practice. Primarily, this occurred in two areas. 
Fin> I , tht~ o 1 d<~r lawyers found pro bono servi.ce to be an effective way 
ol creating eJ ient loy<llt:y. Such services acted as "loss leaders" 
given for minor services to both those who could and those liho could 
not pay. The lawyers then hoped grateful clients would return at a 
l01ter d:tt<• with a more substantial matter that would make up for miss-
17 ing t.lw {•arl·ier fee. The second incentive for established lawyers 
to do pro bono work involved pleasing intermediaries. Intermediaries 
were described earlH~r as the persons who often define the poor's 
problems as legal, and who refer them to specific lawyers for help. 
Sine(• so1o practiout•rs r<~ported intermediaries were often superior in 
:;or j 0(.'('011UIIIi (' I I I I d 18 I . Hl.at.u:-; t tall t w t·l i<•nt t wy rc<~o.-nent e , t 1ese at-
L nrneys' wJ IIi ngness to t::ak<• the poor c 1 i.ents' cases cemented a re-
. 19 
lationship with someone who might COllie to them as a paying clien~. 
Gontp<trt!d to solo pra(:t loners, firm attorneys showed fewer economic 
int·«'ut i.ves to p(~rform pro bono st'rvice. Young firm associates, unlike 
yOUIIf~ SO)O (tTil<'t.i.OOf!TS t had paying legal WOt'k generated for the• by 
th<·i.r ri.r•. f'urthermort~, it was found that intrafim reputation was 
mor<• i11tfturtant to young f.i r• associ ;tt:es ntreer adwmces than their 
reputation with the legal community. Associates feared too much pro 
borio service might appear "di.lettantish" in the ~yes of senior firm 
. 20 
members. Because of this, when they didtake pro bono cases, the 
c~se tended to be a larger and splashier case that would help make a 
name r h l . . 21 or t <• tnn. 
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A further study citing similar findings was "The Private Practicing 
Bar and l.egal Services for Low-Income People," conducted by Dorothy 
l.inder Maddi and Frederic R. f.ferrill. This survey of 604 private 
lawyers, including 204 in Miami, 202 in St. Louis, and 198 in San 
Francisco, paralleled the findings in the urban study by Lochner. Con-
cerning the attorneys' experience in personally providing legal ser-
vh~es to the poor, thP surveyors found that solo practioners tended to 
r<>port more no fee service than firm attorneys. Furthermore, they 
found that attorneys who normally charged higher fees to paying clients 
were more likely to charge no fee to the poor. Lower fee lawyers, on 
the other hand, tended to charge some fee for such services. This was 
j nt<~rpr<•ted as stemming from economic necessity, with the lower fee 
Jawyt•rs ft-c ling a need to charge some kind of fee to every client. if 
at all possib](~, whil(• the higher-fee lawyers might not feel such a 
need. When querh•d as to what factors were considered when deciding 
whc!ther or not. lo t;Jkt• a pro bono case, lawyers most often responded 
the "n.'ltun~ of the t·ase." The next most frequent group of responses, 
however, included the attorney's professional situation at the time of 
the request and tbe sources of the referral as equally strong con-
sid<'rations. Of those persons whose cases were accepted, 75 percent 
lt:td s01tte prior a><•rHOJt:ll contact. with the lawyer, or were referred by 
. .• 22 
SOIIK'Orl(~ who hill e 
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Strengthening Political Advantage 
Anotht~r way I awyers can maximize returns from pro bono work is by 
using it to their politi.cal advantage. This will be seen later to ful-
r .. '11 i I . t t . b h 1 I 1 i h . 2'J 
·1 :-;oc.: a. expec a lOllS a out t e awyer s ro e n t e communtty. 
lf such e.xpectations are not fulfilled, economic sanctions may follow. 
That lawyers tend to bec:ome politicians is an occurrence commonly 
recognized. The field of politics, like the field of law, has been 
.h I i ' · h · 24 st~Nl to e p r:a se a person s status tn t e communtty. In fact, the 
two fields have been eonsidered to have professionally converged. This 
convergence was said to occur when the two professions become more in-
tegrated into the political system, and their members begin to find 
"opportunities that facil i. tate the actual interchange of institutional 
positions, careers, and roles more than is the c~se with other occupa-
tion~;.."25 From campaigning for such political offices the lawyer gen-
· erally i.ncrcases his name recognition within the community. This 
consPcjuently may incn~ase the reputation of his practice,· as well as 
. 26 
t:he number of p;-ayiug clients who will come for legal services. 
When interestt!d in running for office, lawyers may be inclined to 
do favors and lower fees to garner political support. One such example 
was described by the lluke Law Journal's article entitled, "The Legal 
Problems of the Rural Poor." Blacks in the sample were thought by 
Hlack c.:o1111mmit.y leaders to ht• inhibited in seeking legal services be-
cause there was no Jll;tck lawyer available. They did, however, use the 
services of one particular lawyer who had at one tille openly advised 
the school bo:ard tJgainst school desegregation. Since that t.i.e the 
lawyt~r had lmcOMC involved in loc.~at politics. He was now inclined to 
(lu uu I ••c• and I ow IN' work ln or de~ r to eourt the n I ack cummun it y' s 
:) 7 
tml ILl UJ I HUI•t•or·l • 
It is evident • then. that incentives to do pro bono work. exi.st 
beyond n.ere altruism. 28 A "reciprocity system" has been described 
.45 
whereby lawyers maximi.ze their returns from pro bono services. Recog-
nizablc incentives exist, both in directly economic and indirectly, 
economic pol i.ticaJ areas. But what is it that both allows and causes 
such a reciprocal system to work as it does? The best answer to this 
qu,~stion can be derived by examining separately the characteristics of 
cada actor ln the system. 
Characteristics of the Poor That Keep Them 
Complacent to Unequal Legal Aecess 
Introduction 
'fhroughout this paper, stability of the regime has been alluded 
to as a reason for lawyers to perform legal services. Keeping the poor 
satlsfi.ed and with ;a sense of justice has been suggested as one reason 
for increasing legal aid. This sense of justice preserves faith in the 
29 
system and da ... •ens the tendency of the poor to turn to left-leaning 
ntOvements. H SU(.~h is the case, why then have the poor accepted the 
institutionalization of economic legal problems while theirs have gone 
untended? Why have the poor accepted unequal access to lawyers who act 
••s tiae gatekef!pers of the courtroo.? And finally, why have they ac-. 
c~epted unequal treat~nt by lawyers who wish to hurry through their 
<~••ses to get on wHh th<li.r paying business? The answers to thes_e ques-
tions. I ie in Lhe characteristics of the poor as a group. The poor have 
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not. stor.ed the system, demanding equal access first, because they them-
selves do not recognize their problems as legal; and second,· because 
they have social-psychological barriers that inhibit their ability to 
make legal denumds. Each characteristic will be examined in turn to 
provide a better understanding of the limitations they place on the 
po()r • 
UnrecQgnized Needs 
Tht! pro(:c::;s QJ institutiQnalizatiQn is largely respQnsible for the· 
pQor's la(:k of recor,nitiQn Qf legal prQblems. At:~ mentioned before, it 
1 inti Lt•d the areas Qf prQblcms that society consider appropriate to re-
solve by formal legal proeedures. Since the poor's prQblems do not 
nkwt tlw •:ri.teria [(lr such institutionalization, they go largely un-
recognized by both the lawyers and the poor. 
·F.xan!ples Qf tlw poor's problems with recognition of their problems 
abound in the legal aid literature. One survey found that for every 
one dvil legal problem a household recognized, three additional prob-
30 INns Wf.'nt unrt~cognJzed. A survey of those who did not. use available 
1ega1 ::;ervlccs, but were eligible, fQund that their reasQnfor nonuse 
was the lack of property and personal proble•s they felt to be the basis 
for J.eg.;al net•t.ls. 1'hi s was despite over fifty percent of the sample 
IK•inJ.~ Aid to fo,a111il ic•:> Wf.th Ue1.endent Children (AFDC) MOthers with the 
s~ char•u~teristich of ninety percent of the legal service users. The · 
survey .1lso found a greater than noraaal portion of those interviewed 
a~ nonusers were elderly and dld not recognize fa11ily or consu.er re-
. )) 
l:etc•d prohl&.•aco. AnothPr study found that 35 percent of Detroit survey 
rt!Sf)()ndent:.; reported p.-oble•s with govern~~~ental agencies. Of those who 
47 
eonsldt~red these problt!ms relatively st~rious, only t3 percent consulted 
;J Jawyt•r. ·This gap in problem solution through legal channeh was not 
caused by fears of inab111ty to pay or refusals of low fee or no fee 
s<•rvice. Only ont• pc!rcent of the sample reported they had wanted to 
32 
see .,. lawyer about this problem, but had not for any reason. Many 
. 33 
other descriptions of unrecognized needs exist. A goal that various 
authors have shared was the desire to increase the ability amongthe 
poor to act as their own legal "self-diagnostician."34 This is es-
pt!cially c~lled for in our.reactive, as opposed to proactive, system 
of legal access. The Canons of Legal Ethics demand lawyers be reactive 
--or wait for the client to come to him for service. A proactive sys-
35 tem of ltccess allows the advot:ate to search for clients with problems. 
Unless the poor bee0111e better able to recognize their problems, or a 
trend toward proactive access occurs, the present system will continue 
to consistentlyavoid institutionalization of the poor's problems. 
Once the poor recognize their problem as one to be solved best by 
formal legal methods, few differences can be seen in their use of 
. . 36 
Jawy(~rs than that of higher income groups. Problems dealing with 
divorce, lllimony, and child support have been found to show no rela-
tionship to tncOfiiC, occupational status, or education in the incidence 
37 
of seeing a lawyer. In fact, those having tort problems had a sub-
stantially lower .enn inco~~e than those who did not use lawyers for 
such probleiiS. This ..ay have been caused by three factors. First, the 
higher incOMe group probably sought restitution for property da .. ge 
38 
cases fr0111 insurance COIIIpanies. ·. Second, property cases have been· 
seen to be institutionaUzed in the law, .. king the• .ore recognisable 
48 
"'inally. lawycrs wc•rt• probably mOrt! willing to 
lotk•• tori t·a:ws ou bl'leaU ot a poor el icnt hecaus€' such cases could be 
39· 
t;ektm on a c:ontingcnt-fcc bm;is. 
Cons~~quenccs Arising From Non-
recognition of Civil Problems 
As Legal 
l . .eg;tl System AJ h•nations and Misperceptions. Nonrecognition of 
civil problems raises consequences effecting the poor's attitude toward 
the leg:al system in general. The poor have been found mainly to con.;. 
sider the~ legn1 system in terms of criminal actions. One study foun.d 
si.mjlarly that greater than 80 l)"rcent of the lower income group sampled 
bt.dicved IIH· tawyt·•~'s l)rincit•al job was "defending people who are pre-
sumed to lmvt• violated the~ l;tw." Fourteen percent stated more clearly, 
but. still without accuracy, that the lawyer's main function was "help-
ing t.ht.!m to k<~ep with:in the law.n40 
Pr.ior contacts wH.h tlw l<•gal system resulted in an even stronger 
I I. I. . ,. I 41 c<!greP o "tt'lliltton rom lH! process. The study by Carlin and Howard 
eouccrned those sN•king to recover from losses arising out of a car ac-
c idcnt. The d;~ta htpl i.cd that those of lower socio-economic status 
tc•nclf•d l n sN•k d:tnt;t~~t.Hi ) l~SS oftmt than those of higher socio-economic 
status. 1'h(! lowt!r sm:io~conomic status group's inclination to seek 
such redress, either through the courts or through insurance clai•s 
was also inversely related to the nuntber of tiaes they had been in 
42 
cou.rt for :my rc;tson. The syste• did not seem to lUke the poor feel 
wc•1n"'"• within i.ts prot~edurt•s, thus helping to cause their alienation. 
49 
Cost Misperceptions. Another area that shows the public's general 
misunderstanding of the legal system involves misperceptions of legal 
costs. When researching those who did not go to lawyers because they 
did not think they had the ability to pay, one researcher found that 
respondents in all but the highest income levels thought legal services 
J d I . . '-+J were .>eyon t 1e1 r means. Other authors have also evidenced such mis-
percnptions of le<·s ;among Hl1 economic levels, but especially the poor 
'•4 groups. 
Ignorance of Legal Services. One obvious reason that the poor let 
inability to pay hinder their use of a lawyer's services is their ig-
norance ol legal <.tid services. Several authors noted a lack of infor-
mat i.on among the poor, :tbout pro bono or organized legal aid services. 
One study reported 80 percent of lower-class persons interviewed had 
no knowledge of where free or low cost legal services could be found. 45 
Anottwr study ~imi l;ady found that 76 pf~rcent of those surveyed were 
. . ,. I i 46 1.guorant o sue 1 S(' rv · C(~S. 
Nonlegal Alternatives. Alienation to the system; misperceptions 
. of costs, :md ignorance ol legal aid can be seen to induce some of the 
poor to turn to otlu~r, nonlegal methods of solving their problems. 
Hcs<c•arclwrs h:ave found the poor may turn to "outsi.de connnunity re-
sourcc~s when tlwi r prohlt~m .is associc1ted with institutionalized legal 
work or polict' n•lat('(l issues." These researchers noted, however, the 
i.nabi lity of outsidl• resources to solve the hard-core problems of 
47 povt!rty. An t•xct•l lc>nt ~xample of such problems was reported by the 
JlenVl'l" l.;1w .Journul· in l.lwir <Jrtiele, "Rural Poverty and the Law in 
Southern Golor:ulo." 1'he survc•y lound a system of h(dp to the poor 
50 
made up of "confidants." Usually older, established members of the 
connunity, the confidant drafted single legal instruments, dispensed 
infoTmation to the poor, gave out quasi-legal advice and affirmatively 
48 interceded wi.th other community members on behalf of the poor. The 
study group found this confidant system to be strictly a Spanish-
American phenomenan, however, probably arising out of the old patron 
d . . f 1 Ame . S . h M · 1 49 tra 1t1.ons o. ear y · r1.can, pan1s , or ex1can sett ements. An-
other method of solving problems that was noted by the Southern Colo-
rado researchers was a propensity for the poor to resort to "self-
help" and "interpersonal dealings" as a solution to. problems. This 
the researchers also found to be linked to a Spanish-American tradition 
--the tradition of machismo. Examples of such self-help techniques in-
eluded "conmon law" divorces, extr~-legal division of properties when 
no wi.ll was left·, landlord-tenant problems, and the formation of co-
50 
operatives. The research team noted almost all nonlegal techniques 
were largely ineffective in non-institutionalized issues and in con-
flicts with the established order. 51 
SimUar findings by the previously cited Duke Law Journal North 
Ga·rol ina rural poor survey showed a similar system among nonethnic 
poor. The tenant farm operators and an industrial plant operator per-
formed a similar service to that of the "confidant." Their paternal-
isti.c actions inc~luded assistance in minor criminal matters including 
the pay.-ent o( [i.nes and J>Osting of bail, as well as consultation and 
loans when ttw problem f.nvol.ved money. A further service performed 
for the poor also involved intercession on behalf of the poor with 
52 local creditors. Effectiveness of this form of help was evidenced 
by th<~ tact that over .. 50 percent of the poor respondents acknowledged 
51 
the inability to meet. clehls or make:~ pnyments on purchnses when due, but 
only 5 percent were t.wer sued and even fewer experienced reposses-
. 53 
s~ons. 
Socio-Psychological Problems That 
Keep Some Poor From Attaining 
Effective Legal Services 
Introduction. Beyond the effects of nonrecognition and its many 
consequences, researchers have noticed problems that the individual poor 
person has in dealing with the rest of his or her connunity. Three such 
socio-psychological problems--fear of reprisals, inaction, and psycho-
logical distress--will be discussed to further the reader's understand-
! 
ing of the poor's complacency in the face of an unequal system. 
I 
Fear of Reprisals. Some poor persons have shown fear of reprisals 
from both private interests and public agencies, against whom effective 
action would have had to be taken to have relieved their problem. One 
study especially sighted fear of reprisals from landlords, employers, 
54 
merchants, suppliers of public assistance, and the police. Further 
study in the area contended that government "largess," or subsidies to 
the poor in the form of welfare benefits, tended to build pressures 
against contesting civil liberty issues. Afraid of losing their sub~ 
sidy, the poor were found to be less willing to assert their Constitu-
55 tional rights. An exaaple of such a feared reprisal happening was 
seen in the governaental reaction to the San Francisco Legal Assistance 
Foundation defeat of the California one-year residency requirement for 
welfare benefits. This defeat, along with other state developments, 
52 
triggered austerity measures which stiffened criteria for welfare 
eligibility, and tightened enforcement of these requirements. The 
restrictions were so great that total welfare recipients in California 
56 decreased despite an increase in unemployment. 
Inaction. Another characteristic of some of the poor that tends 
to dampen their demands on the legal system is a propensity toward in-
action. When a person decides to take action he accepts the appropri-· 
ateness, efficacy, and fairness of legal solutions. 57 A previously 
mentioned study by Carlin and Howard indicated such inaction among the 
lower socio-economic status sampled by the survey. Involving actions 
taken after an auto accident, 27 percent of the lower status respondents 
reported doing nothing, compared to,only 2 perce~t of the higher status 
58 group. Another student of the pr.oblem concluded that the poor are 
characterized, in general, by passive rather than active reactions to 
59 
every day situations. This would point especially to a low feeling 
of efficacy, or the ability to change things, in an economically based 
system. 
Psychological Distress. A great number of poor nonusers of legal 
services gave field researchers the overriding impression that they 
were' unable to use the program because of social and psychological dis-
orientations. This nonuser subgroup appeared alienated, resigned 'to 
the status quo, suspicious, and lonely. Researchers recorded many neg~ 
ative connents about lawyers, including, "1 would rather go to a mensber 
of the Mafia before going to a lawyer;" and "Most of them are nuts. 
60 They bleed you until you go to court." The conclusions that were 
drawn sugg<~sted ttu1l "t:he decision to request an offered service is 
beyond the emotional capacity of some of the potential clients."61 
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ConClusion. Research·supports three major characteristics of the 
poor that act to keep them complacent in the face of an unequal access 
to the legal system. Non-recognition of legal problems, its conse-
quences and social-psychological problems were substantiated by pre-
vious research. Backed by this understanding of the poor's complacency, 
an examination of problems in the lawyer's environment should bring 
increased uuderstanding of why the lawyer needs to maximize returns on 
pro bono service. 
Problems in the Lawyer's Environment That Lead 
Him to Maximize Prbfits From Pro Bono Service 
Introduction 
The development of lawyer referral was seen as a boon to young 
lawyers in search of clients. 62 The service referrer helped these 
less-established lawyers come in contact with needed clients. After 
. . 
thi.s initial contact, the lawyer was free to charge anything he and 
63 his client felt was reasonable. The lawyer referral system acted in 
such situations as a surrogate for direct solicitation, which is for...o 
bidden by the Bar Association's Canon of Ethics. 64 One such method of 
direct solicitation included in this ban includes some forms of ad ... 
vertisewaent. The effect of such a ban on advartisement has been seen 
to increase the difficulty of establishing a solo practice. An analy-
siS of the ban on advertisement should provide better insight 
54' 
of why the lawyer is able to use pro bono services to his economic ad~ 
vantage. 
Later in this section, another problem that lawyers must contend 
with will be discussed. This problem concerns the need to fulfill s6-
cial expectations of the lawyer's role or risk economic sanctions from 
the community. Two areas of expectations will be examined--the politi-
cal and the philanthropic. These areas of discussion should furthe-r 
the understanding of the lawyer's needs that can be met by the pro bono 
se·rvice system. 
The Ban on Legal Advertising 
The Pros and Cons. The denial of legal advertising raises con-
i . 
fli.cting value questions. Advocates of the ban content that it pro.-
tects the public from misrepresentation and overreaching on the part 
of ambulance-chasing lawyers. Second, they contend, the ban on adver-
tisement is in the interest of society because it helps to avoid the 
stirring up of litigation that might not otherwise make its way to the 
courtroom. A third reason they forward to justify the ban involves a 
desire for those who have worked hard and built a practice to be able 
_ to preserve this advantage. Finally. the ban is said to serve a bar 
association desire to avoid the commercialization of the legal business 
for fear it will eheapen the services of the entire profession. 65 
Another set of equally cogent reasons calls for the removal of 
such a ban. Some contend that the removal of the ban will be in the 
public interest by increasing readily available legal ·services because 
of the increased infora.ation that would help potential clients recog-
nize their legal problems. This is the service that is now allowed to 
prlv;ite lawyers and organhed legal .aid under the revised code of 
6t) 
cth:ics. II. sec.~ond reason seen for allowing advertisement is that .it 
wi. 11 improve the economic condition cf the bar. This is almost a 
corollary to their first justification for removal of the ban. Ad-
55 
vertiscment in the legal business as in any other business can only be 
expected to bring in more clients. A final contention, and the most 
genera 1 of thE.• lot, suggests that free enterprise in the legal . sy.stem 
would promote both the publi.c's and the legal profession's interests by 
67 
ensuring quality and access to all, even if prices must drop. 
A Revised Code. Mention was made above of the revisions made in 
the code of ethics and its ban on legal advertising. A recent U.S. 
Supremf' Court decision caused a modification in the han to a small ex-
68 tent. Such an all-inclusive ban was seen as ~ violation of the in-
dividual lawyer's First Amendment Freedom of Speech. The ruling 
required the highest court in almost every state to reconsider their 
stance on tlw lawyer advertising question. This has not loosened the 
restrictions much, however. The current Oklahoma law has limited the 
ban to .<tllow for generic advertisement in the public interest. This 
is the same form of instructive advertisement allowed by the American 
Bar Association to all legal aid programs. Approval of such activities 
was extended to telling why legal problems should be brought to a 
I;Jwyer, and how a l.;awyer's services could be obtained at reasonable 
69 
cost. 
Even though this fom of advertisement has existed for quite some 
time in tlw legal services field, severe limitations have been found 
i.n i.ts use. Noting that legal services get nowhere unless advertised, 
the ethics ot the advertisement controversy has caused most publicity 
56 
to be handled very delicately. 70 One difficult problem has been re-
terral of those who came to a legal aid society for help and who were 
1 . •t l 71 not f~ 1g~ J e. To refer such a person has been seen as having a pro-
active, or access initiating, nature that is considered an improper 
solicitation by the bar. 
Conclusions. Thus without advertising, the problem of developing 
a solopractice remains largely intact. As with any new business, if 
the public does not know it exists they don't come. The new lawyer 
cannot rely on past customers to send more clients until there are past 
customers. The new lawyer especially must rely on promotional tech-
niques that include taking pro bono referrees, joining social and fra-
t<~rnal organizations, and running for political office in hope of making 
72 paying dient contacts. As long as the ban on advertising exists for 
a 11 but limited purposes, lawyers wishing to build or maintain a practice 
will probably keep turning to pro bono services as one substitute for 
advertising. One writer on the justification for lowering procurement 
restrictions said, 
Real progress lies in group action to reorganize the getting 
of business and the doing of it in keeping with the age: in 
standardizing, spreading, and lowering the price of service. 
·Once service J.s sure, the Bar can outpublicize any lay com-
petitor ••• n 
If the legal profession ever takes such steps, it will need to be ready 
to meet the need brought about by the new legal awareness. Until then, 
the reciprocity syste11 described at the first of this chapter will most 
probably continue. This system, through the use of intermediaries has 
proven to be an effective and accepted way to find customers. 
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Soct:tl Roh~ Expt~ctations of Lawyers 
Introduction. Another characteristic of the environment in which 
lawyers must work, is the development of role expectations by other mem-
hers of the community. These roles arise from expectations concerning 
the lawyer's function and conduct as seen by at: least three important 
hi 1 . h' 1 1 11 d h' . . 74 groups-- s c 1ents, 1s ega co eagues, an 1s commun1ty. 
The major question in the area concerns the effect of social role 
expectations on lawyer's pro bono services. First the lawyer's attitude 
toward his or her indigent clients should be explained. The underlying 
attitude here seems to be tl1at the poor person is essentially a welfare 
clierit who receives free service as a privilege, not as a right. 
J•'urthermon1 this "privilege" is granted solely a1t the discretion of the 
75 lawyer, and only if the poor person is found to ,be deserving. By 
this reasoning, the performance of legal services should be evaluated 
in keeping with the social norms regarding philanthropy. 
Philanthropic Expectations. The system of norms for the regulat-
ing and directing of philanthropic activities has been found by re-
searchers to be very ()Owerful. Indeed, they have found that this system 
of norms w;1s so strong that departure from them might entail penalties 
severe enough to affect an individual's social ambitions or business 
·76 
career. lf pro bono work is seen as a charity donation given by the 
Jawyer., inferrence suggests it too must be done under these norm re-
strictions. 
One survey attempted to find who in the col'llllunity was in charge 
of establishing priorities among the services and enforcing sanctions. 
'l'he researchers found that a social elite, or "Inner Circle" of the 
58 
town's establishment prescribed the amount of time members of the com-
munity should dona.te. This prescription for service was seen as being 
b:&scd on occu1)ation, relative importance in the business world, amount 
of free time to give, and the help that could be expected from one's 
. 77 
office staff. · Powerful social sanctions were seen as inducing com-
munity members to participate. These negative sanctions were available 
for anyone who did not perform, or for those who donated time to unac-
78 
ceptable causes. This can be expected to have affected the present 
pro bono reciprocity system. Since the policy posiUons of the Inner 
Circle were never seen to be stated directly, but only implied, lawyers 
may feel a strong social pressure to perform some pro bono services or 
lose the good graces of the communi~Y· This alsp accounts for the types 
of casE~s th(! private lawyer will and will not take on a pro bono bas.is. 
One-third of the lawyers interviewed in one rural survey conceded that 
they could not take on the cases of persons and groups unpopular in the 
community. The lawyers in this survey all avoided welfare and social 
st~cur.ity benefit claims, and also hesitated to deal with landlord-tenant 
d . 79 1sputes. 
Co11111unity Leadership Expectations. Another area of social expec-
tations affecting lawyers is the community leadership role they may be 
expected to perform. This citizenship role was not always .seen clearly 
but was defined as "those behavior expectations pertaining to the lawyer 
in relation to his community and society which are not those of every 
80 
citizen and which are not part of the technical function as a lawyer." 
It was found that e::.;pecially in the smaller towns, lawyers were ex-
. 81 pectecJ to m."\ke themselves ava Hable as a public servant. Other 
59 
similar cxprctations involved being av~ilable for non-political leader-
~:hit' t•o~dtlons in pltJ1unthrop1e dt"lves, and to pt>rformi.ng law-related 
82 Jcg<d ••id work. 1'his supports the pievious research describing the 
Inner Circle of the top community elites and extends the idea of social 
pressure to conform to political role expectations. 
Such inferred role expectations have been seen to be internalized 
by lawyers. These expectations mesh well with the lawyer's natural 
economic interest in community development, and his interest in build-
. . 83 ing his pr~ctice by the use of pro bono activities. 
Direct political involvement has been seen to quite interestingly 
vary by the type of lawyer's practice. The solo practitioner in one 
survey was found to participate more often in the political than in the 
I 
philanthropic activities, although he was more active in both areas 
than was the firm attorney. Fifty-six percent of the solo practitioners 
reported political activities, while only 40 percent reported philan-
thropic work. For the firm attorney, participation in nonpolitical 
philanthropic work was more common; 36 percent participating in some 
f h i . 84 type o t e act v1ty. 
In partisan political activities, however, only 23 percent of the 
f:i rm attorneys acknowledged their participation. This difference in 
choice of outlet for performance of sociai role expectations was by-
pothesized by the researchers to be caused by the solo practitioner's 
need for the career advancement and the name recognition that campaign-
. 85 
ing could give to hi~ or her. For an example of this role expecta-
t.ion bringing lawyers into public service, one need only turn to the 
previously cited southern Colorado study. Researchers here found that 
60 
all lawyers were solo practitioners, and that 38 out of 45, or 84 per-· 
86 
cent, had run for elective county position. 
Conclusions. Now that a better understanding of clients' problems 
and lawyers' needs has been attained, the only actor left to examine is 
the intermediary. Once this discussion is complete, the reader should 
have sufficient background to adequately understand the incentives for 
lawyers to perform pro bono legal services work. Once this understand-
ing has been attained, the questionof setting priorities between eco-
nomic i.nccntJves and social expectation incentives may be further 
explort~d. 
·characteristics of Intermediaries and How They 
Bring No Fee or
1
Low ,Fee Clients in Contact 
I 
With Lawyers 
llow the System Works 
The OE!ed for further study of the intermediary relationship has 
been recognized by researchers as necessary to improve the utilization 
. of· lega] . 87 serv J.ces. Despite this, little has been reported on the ac-
t ivi ti(•s and eharacterist ics of the group as it pertains to legal· aid. 
Phillip Lochner hns written the major contribution in this a:rea. Bas-
ing his study on the two-step flow of communication developed by Elihu 
88 Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Lochner found the use of an intermediary 
was c;ll h~d for because of two major reasons. First, lawyers are pre-
v(mted from seeking out no fee and low fee clients proactively because 
89 
of professional ethics demands and economic exigencies. Because of 
their reliance on profit, more lucrative business would probably be the 
61 
pr(!y uf such ;t sc;u(:h, even if it was allowed. On the other hand, be-
cause of psychological and informational barriers, the poor do not ac-
90 tively seek out the services of a lawyer. Thus an intermediary 
system is needed in order for the two actors to come together. 
Intermediary Differences by Lawyer's 
of Practice 
Solo Practitioners' Intermediaries. In his Buffalo, New York, 
survey, Lochner found the intermediaries of solo practitioners were more 
likely to be the business and social contacts of the lawyer. These 
people had the apptopriate·contacts with lawyers who did some pro bono 
services, they were in contact with the poor for reasons to be dis-
1 
cussed momentarily, and they had resources in problem solving that the 
I . 
. 91 
poor generally lacked. ·The most common intermediaries recognized by 
the lawyers were listed as doctors, ministers, employers, union of-
fleers, city councilmen, neighbors and friends,· a fellow Elk, and 
.· . 92 
brothers-in-law. The poorer clients often contacted these people 
hoping they would directly be able to solve their problems. It was 
then that the poor's problems were defined as legal, and that they 
93 
were referred to a lawyer the intermediary thought would help. 
What motivated these solo practitioner intermediaries, as well as 
those for firm attorneys to perform such a role? Several answers were 
hypothesized here.; The psychological and personal satisfaction of 
helping s0111eone in trouble was one possible answer. Another solution 
was that the referral kept the intermediary from having to worry fur ... 
ther.with the poor person's problem. Finally, those in politics and 
business m.1y have expected favors done for them at a later date in 
62 
r<!turn for the referral. · Regardless of what the specific motives were, 
Lochn(~r concluded that incenti.ves probably needed not to be compelling, 
~;ince little HCti.on was called for on the part of the intermediary. 94 
Firm Attorneys' Intermediaries. In contrast to the solo prac-
titioner, the firm attorney more often sought out nonremunerative work 
by volunteering his services to civil liberties and other groups that 
helped the disadvantaged. They were, however, less likely than the 
solo practitioner to take referral low fee and no fee work as well as 
more likely to do none of this type of work at al1. 95 This is in keep- . 
ing with previous analysis that found the activities of firm lawyers 
tended to be more philanthropic than economic or politically oriented. 
The primary difference, as mentioned by lawyers, 1 was a stronger primacy 
of attention for their paying clients. Many lawyers admitted just not 
having time to do such work because of the demands of their paying 
practice. 96 The economic differences between solo practitioners and 
firm lawyers is shown most distinctly here. Firm lawyers showed far 
less interest in, or need to build and maintain their practice. Social 
expectations did, however, seem to encourage taking on some pro bono 
activity. 
Another major difference between the no fee and low fee services 
· o[ solo practitioners and the firm attorneys, was the personal charac-
tf!ri sties of tht! firm attorney's intermediaries. Whereas the solo 
pr.:H:titloner's clients were more like him in socio-economic status, the 
fi.rm attorney's intermediaries "did not tend to be the clear educa-
97 tiona), financial, or occupational superior of their [poor] clients." 
Thi.s would seem to eliminate any motive of gaining the intermediary as 
a client. or of doing the type of service needed to keep him • satisfied 
63 
customer. Instead, this once again shows the firm attorney.being more 
interested in satisfying social expectations, as opposed to the solo 
practitioner's concern with economic and political incentives. 
Limits· on an Intermediary 
Dependent System 
Another concern of an intermediary based system deals with what 
limits there are in its ability to bring the poor in contact with the 
needed lawyers. Lochner noted first that there was a limit on the 
number of clients an intermediary would send. Primarily this seem_ed 
to be the case because the intermediaries did not contact too many 
people who would need such services. Second, he believed the inter-
mediary would not want to put the lawyer in the ,position of performing 
such work too often. This, Lochner concluded, was based on a fear of 
wearing out the intermediary's welcome, and possibly straining his or 
98 her relationship with the lawyer• 
Another limit found inherent in the solo practitioners' form of 
intermediary relationships was that many groups were excluded from 
legal services. Since this type of lawyer did not often seek non-
99 
remumerative legal services on his own, the system was dependent on 
contacts with a group who would act as an intermediary. Lochner found 
this group's contacts were seriously limited in several.areas. One 
such limit was that most of those brought in by intermediaries to solo. 
practitioners were members of the middle class who had fallen on hard 
times. This explains why the no fee and low fee clients were in touch 
with the similarly middle class intermediaries. 100 
64 
Blacks were another group found underrepresented by the inter-
mediary system. The survey found few Blacks were given no few or low 
fcc help, primarily because they lacked the necessary contacts with 
. d. i . 101 1nterme an.es. Lochner hypothesized the situation would better 
itself as mi.norities continued to move up the social class ladder, thus 
102 
making the necessary contacts. 
Lochner also found that most no fee and low fee clients were in 
their twenties and thirties. He explained this as the ·lack of inter-
mediary contacts by those young and/or older, who were often isolated 
f h . 1 . 103 rom t ese socia connections. 
The significance of groups being excluded from the intermediary 
networks of the solo practitioners lies in the degree to which this 
I 
makes the system ineffective in dealing with the needs of all the poor. 
Because of the multiple incentives of building their practice, seeking 
political advantage, and fulfilling other role expectations, solo 
practitioners have been seen to be more willing to take on pro bono 
work. I.ochner found that 27 percent of firm attorneys in his survey 
did not take any no fee or low fee work. This was compared to only 18 
f h 1 . . 104 percent o. t e so o pract1t1oners. Since the solo practitioner 
does more of this type of work, those who are excluded from his ser-
vices have less of a chance of getting any service at all. 
An Example of a Southern Colorado 
Intermediary System 
The Denver Law Journal also noted the existence of an intermediary· 
system in their study. Researchers supported Lochner's description of 
the workings of the system by findingthe poor first took their 
65 
undefined problems to intermediaries who then referred them on toa law .... 
yer. They found, however, that even though most of the lawyers were 
solo pract it loners, their intermediaries resembled those of the law firm 
attorney in Lochner's study. These intermediaries were most likely to 
105 be a friend or relative of the poor client. This showed a much great-
er disparity between the intermediary and the solo practitioner's status 
than was the case in Lochner's study. 
Analysis of this differing relationship probably indicates the 
rural southern Colorado lawyer's greater preoccupation with fulfilling 
social expectations. This is further backed by a finding mentioned 
previously about the high rate of rural southern Colorado lawyers' po-
l i.tical participation. Thirty-eight out of forty-five, or 84 percent, 
acknowledged being active in elective politics. Their performance of 
legal aid probably went to further their political careers and to ful-
fill other expectations of the conmunity. 
Conclusion 
The system of reciprocity found to motivate no fee and low fee 
work has dimensions beyond those of simple altruism. The analysis of 
characteristics peculiar to each actor hopefully has furthered the 
understanding of why and how the system comes about as it does. - How-
ever, the major question that has arisen involves when the lawye,r is 
inclined to favor econ01nic reciprocity; and when the indirectly eco-
nomic, social expectations of lawyers are stronger incentives. These 
questions, as well as others, will be developed in the following chapter 
along with a description of the methodology used to seek their answers. 
• 
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CHAPTER IV 
HYPOTHESES, METHODOLOGY, AND DEMOGRAPHICS 
Introduction and Hypotheses 
In Chapter III a system of economic reciprocity was discussed as 
a method by which lawyers can maximize their returns from pro bono ac-
tivities. Building a practice was seen as one incentive for less-
estabU shed lawyers to perform legal services. In this situation the 
clients either paid some small amount then, or eventually became pay-
. 1. 1 1ng c 1ents. Maintaining a practice was also n@ted as having profit-
oriented incentives for performing the pro bono services. Oftentimes 
better estahl i.shed lawyers were willing to perform no fee or low fee 
.services for a client as a way to please an intermediary by whom they 
had been sent. This served as a public relations measure between the 
1 d h . d' h f . 1' 2 .awyer an t e 1nterme 1ary woo .ten was a pay1ng c 1ent. Finally, 
it was found that performance of political arid philanthropic role ex.;.. 
pectations could also he advantageous to a lawyer's practice as they 
fulfilled social expectations derived from the considered role. of the 
3 lawyer in the community. These pro bono activities served as pro-
motional techniques by increasing the lawyer's name recognition and by 
fulfilling hls expected duties within the community. Choice of these 
economic incentives tended to vary according to the lawyer's type of 
legal practice, 4 as well as between locales. 5 
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The rural and urban based studies all revealed systems of recipro-
city wla i ch served as an lncenU ve for lawyers to provide pro bono ser-
vices to the poor. They did not always agree, however, oil what type 
returns would be sought by each type of lawyer. In the urban studies, 
solo practitioners were found to have more incentives to take on no fee 
or low fee clients to build or maintain a practice. The solo prac-
titioner also tended to run for political office more often because of 
the promotional effect it could have on business. On the other hand, 
urban firm attorneys did not seem to feel the direct economic squeeze 
as strongly as their solo practitioner brethern. They tended to perform 
more no fee service and do more philanthropic work, which more indirect-
ly supported their practice by fulfilling social role expectations. 
I 
These were indirectly economic .motives because of the possibility of 
I T 
profit-related sanctions that existed if such role expectations were 
not fulfilled. 
The rural survey~ pointed to some differences from those of the 
urban area. Rural lawyers, most commonly solo practitioners, were 
found to perform more social role-oriented services than their urban 
counterparts. This manifested itself primarily in increased political 
activity. With a ratio of lawyers to population as high as the one. 
found by the Duke Law Journal survey (1:3,667), few lawyers needed to 
build a prncticc. 6 
These case studies, and the differences in economic situations 
found between lawyers in urban versus rural settings, led to the ques-
tions addressed by this paper concerning small town pro bono services. 
Several earlier authors have made assumptions about legal services in 
small towns. In th~ 1920s one writer concluded there were inherent 
differtm<:cs bC'tween the small d.ty poor nnd the metropolitan poor in 
their degree of need for legal aid services. She said: 
In small cities the amount of legal aid work is not great. A .. 
legal aid society would not be justified. The voluntary ser-
vice of attorneys, however, takes care of the problem ade..,. 
quately, but it should be done in an organized way togive 
the best service with the least amount of imposition and 
needless effort.7 
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An early authority on legal aid services, John S. Bradway, also noted a 
similar assumption when in his discussion of developing legal aid in the 
smaller community he said: 
Again, one inclines to the thought, not in criticism of the 
metropolitan areas, that the client himself may count for 
more in the country. His problem stands out, not merely as 
another statistic lost in the crowd, but as the catastrophe 
of a neighbor.8 
Another early author wrote about the differenceslof the small town of 
around 25,000, or in some cases as much as so,oo6 population, from the 
city. He concluded optimistically that in the small town: 
All the lawyers are known, and people who have legal work to 
do are moderately aware of it; and they have little difficulty 
in finding a lawyer of whose character, abilities, experience~ 
yes, and fees, they can get some fair inkling of ahead of 
time~9 
Similar assumptions were forwarded more recently in a 1970 treatise 
by another renowned legal aid writer, Barlow F. Christensen. He hy-
pothesized ,that the only places where a traditional, non-advertising 
legal aid system could work would be the small town. He based this on 
the assumptions that small towns of about 25,000, but no more than 
50,000, weremade of a more homog~neous people than the big cities. 
1'ilis enables everyone in the town to know everyone else. Within such a 
small toWn he explained that a highly efficient informal communication 
system could exist, through which a reputation could be established. 
As a consequence to these assumptions, he. felt that even the least 
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sophisticated member of the community was able to recognize his legal 
problems and know where to turn for a lawyer's service. 1° Christensen 
went on to contend that the major cause for inadequacy of the tra-
ditional model was urbanization. He noted first that urban life was 
increasingly complex because of the need to exist in crowded areas. 
Also increased contact with non-governmental groups such as unions, in-
surance companies, and credit companies, in addition to the expansion 
of governmental regulation of individual activities further complicated 
urban life. He concluded that as complexity increased, recognition of 
problems as being legal decreased. Finally he noted the communication 
within the urban area was not as effective as it was in the small town. 
This was a major reason for which advertising would be needed in the 
city while in the small town it might not be necessary. 11 
During the 1950s two writers did not hold these same assumptions 
about the small town. One author noted that a poor person in a small 
town may have made the acquaintance of a lawyer, for example, when they 
were in high school. He found, however, that there was no evidence to 
show that proportionately more people had their own lawyers in the small 
town, nor was ther£! any reason to believe that the small town poor had 
fewer legal problems. 12 In a similar study, another pair of authors 
noted the general view that the smaller towns were more friendly, and 
the inhabitants showed more interest in neighbor's affairs and were more 
apt to know each other. Yet they also pointed out that a lawyer's 
neighborliness might be overemphasized because of the economic pres-
sures he or she shared with the city lawyer. Like the city lawyer, he 
or she must take ·each part of his practice into account economically. 
The study found that the lawyer in the small town had no more time, no 
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more compelling sense of duty, and no more public-spiritedness than his 
13 
urban counterpart. 
From previous analysis in the earlier chapters, it is the hypothe.-
sis of this paper that pro bono services in small towns are not greatlr 
different from those in large cities. Increased neighborliness cannot 
overcome the lack of institutionalization of poverty problems caused by 
lawyer specialization or the poor's non-recognition of their own prob-
lems as legal. The lawyer in the small town must be i.nterestedin mak-
ing a profit like all other businessmen in both the small conununity and 
the big city. This profit motive leads to a desire to maximize returns 
off all services, including pro bono activities. When the economic need 
of the lawyer is great, as when the ratio of lawyers to population be-
l 
comes relatively small, the small town lawyer sh?uld be found to use 
similar practice building and maintaining techniques as his or her ur-
ban cousins. These should include direct increases to the practice 
through pro bono services for only small fees, or as "loss leaders" to 
bring in paying work later. The incentives may also manifest them,-
selves indirectly through political activities that find pro bono 
services helpful in gathering support. 
If the above development holds true, a survey of the lawyers in 
a county centered around the functioning of a small town hypothetically 
should find that: 
la. Regular and pro bono practices should be found to deal 
with similar kinds of legal problems. 
lb. In their regular and pro bono practices, lawyers shotild 
be found to spend similar amounts of time on similar 
types of legal problems. 
lc. Pro bono cases handled for the poor will be resolved 
quickly, allowing the lawyers to return to their paying 
practices. 
2. The uno of pral·tfct~ bui.ldlng and maintain promotional 
techniques, as well as legal advertising advocacy 
should vary by the lawyer's economic situation. 
3a. Differences in amounts of pro bono activity performed 
by lawyers should be found to depend on their economic 
situation. 
3b. Differences in types of clients served by lawyers 
should vary by the lawyer's economic situation. 
3c. Differences in types of intermediaries that refer 
clients to lawyers should vary by the lawyer's 
economic situation. 
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Each of these hypotheses will be examined in turn in the following 
chapter. Explanatory data wi.ll be drawn from a survey of lawyers in a 
small.:...town...:centered county. Before analysis of this data may begin, 
the reader should be familiar with the research design of the survey, 
the questionnaire used to gather responses, and the demographics of the 
target county and responding lawyers. 
Methodology 
Research Design 
No suggestion of random choice may be made about the county chosen 
for this survey. Pittsburg County, Oklahoma, was chosen for two reasons. 
First, it fits the specifications of a small-town-based county. 
McAlester is the largest town within the county, with a 1970 population 
of 18,802. The next largest town ranks a distant second with only 
2,121 people in 197o. 14 Second, in Pittsburg County lay the greatest 
possibility of access to informatipn and researcher credibility. The 
author was raised in McAlester, and was acquainted with the lawyers 
through previous church, work, and social acti.vities. For the others, 
coverletters were attached to the survey explaining the researcher's 
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conllllu.n:ity relationship. Support for a local's project ran very high, 
as most county 1 awyers showed a wi ll.i ngness to cooperate. with the sur-
V<'y • 
Presumption of a tendency for locals to trust and support a fellow 
local was not solely relied upon, however. To further establish credi-
bility, contact with the current Pittsburg County Association Presid~nt, 
Mr. Charles D. "Ruddy'' Neal, was made. Mr. Neal generously answered 
questions and supported the survey. His greatest help came from his 
announcement of the survey at the Pittsburg County Bar Association 
monthly meeting. While conducting the survey, several lawyers men-
tioned that they had heard the announcement at the last Bar meeting, 
and had been waiting to be contacted. Finally, contact with former 
Speaker of the U. S. House of Representatives, Mr. Carl Albert, was 
made. Mr. Albert agreed to vouch for the credibility of the researcher 
if any questions were raised. At each survey drop, the lawyer or his 
receptionist was told that if any questions arose, the lawyer could 
contact the researcher at the horne phone number provided on the cover 
letter, or he could contact Mr. Albert or Mr. Neal for information con-
cerning the survey and researcher's credibility. 
Such e>{treme measures to ensure credibility were undertaken in an 
effort to receive the highest possible response rate. The total number 
of lawyers in private practice was only 37 for all of Pittsbtirg County. 
These names were detcrmined.from a March, 1979, telephone yellow-pages 
listing, the Oklahoma Lawyers Manual (or the Blue Book), and by verbal 
contact. Due to this sinall number, a census was performed instead of 
a sample. This provided the greatest number possible and helped in 
analysis by ensuring larger cross-tabulation cell sizes. 
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The survey was conducted on Apri 1 10 and April 13, 1979. On 
April 10 each survey was personally delivered to each Pittsbtirg County 
lawyer's office. Either the attorney, or his receptionist was informed 
that the survey would be used for aggregate data anlysis only, and that 
the purpose was to collect data for a Master's thesis in Political 
Science at Oklahoma State University. The importance of a high return 
rate and the previously mentioned credibility references were also de ... 
scribed. Many lawyers and receptionists showed considerable interest 
in such an undertaking, and immediately gave an assurance of their will-
ingness to comply with the request. Combined with the cover letter that 
reiternted the survey purpose, assured individual respondent privacy 
and cited credibility sources, a copy of the survey was then left at 
I 
eacl1 office. Three exceptions to this general pattern occurred, how-
ever. One more elderly gentleman complained of failing eye-sight and 
requested the researcher to ask him the questions orally and take down 
his responses. Two other lawyers asked if they might fill out the sur-
vcy then while the researcher was still present. Questions asked by 
these two lawyers were answered in such a manner as to clarify the 
question, but not to influence the response. Only one direct refusal 
to participate was encountered. 
When the survey waa dropped at the lawyer's office, the researcher 
informed the lawyer or his receptionist that a return visit would be 
made that Friday, April 13, to gather the lawyer's responses. Knowing 
that such a return visit was to be made, it was hoped that the lawyer 
would be more likely to complete the form more quickly. On this day, 
eighteen of the lawyers had completed their surveys and had them ready 
lor collection. Two surveys were then returned with the receptionist 
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explaining that the lawyers did not wish to participate. For all 
others, stamped envelopes addressed to the researcher were dispensed. 
The researcher then stressed the importance of a high return rate, and 
assured the office contact that even if the survey was mailed late, it 
still could be used. This last measure was an attempt to gain those 
surveys that might be pushed aside for several weeks. Six returns were 
received from the mailback request. This finalized the response r~:fte 
at 65%, with 24 out of 37 lawyers responding. This compares favorably 
with the Lochner study return rate of 77 percent, and the Denver re-
sponse rate of 49 percent. The Duke study had a 100 percent response 
rate, but they interviewed few laWy-ers--only three in the entire rural 
15 target area. 
Questionnaire Design 
The questionn::dre was designed to answer six areas of inquiry. 
These areas included characteristics of the lawyer's pro bono services, 
characteristics of intermediaries bringing clients, his ex.perience with 
no fee or low fee clients returning as paying clients, his attitude 
toward legal advertising, relative characteristics of small town prac-
d d h . 16 tices, an emograp 1cs. For examination of specific questions in 
these areas, refer to Appendix A. 
Many questions were designed with set responses to help keep cell 
size as large as possible. However, on most of these questions, an 
"other" category was provided to prevent forced answers. These open-
ended responses were coded as additional response categories for data 
analysis. Questions·seeking information on types of cases performed 
for the poor, the method of their resolution, and the areas of law most 
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dominant in the lawyer's practice were all. set up to elicit an es-
timated percentage response. This was necessary, especially in the 
first two instances, as few lawyers keep records of pro bono service, 
and were prone to be answering from memory. Percentages here were 
thought to have more credibility as an estimate than number of cases. 
It also was thought to he more comparable for analysis between groups 
of lawyers. The most difficult question in terms of inappropriate 
lawyer response called for a ranking, in order of perceived frequency 
of use, of five actions that the Pittsburg County poor might undertaka 
to solve their problems. Many questionnaires only contained one action 
marked. For coding purposes, these were defined as the lawyer's first 
choice, with all four other possible responses coded as missing data. 
The remaining questions were of the open-ended type. These were coded 
I 
in as few categories as responses justified, once again to hold cate-
gories' numbers small and improve cell size. 
The questionnaire length was also taken into consideration. With 
further hope of increasing the response rate, the questionnaire ~as 
kept to the front and back of one legal-sized sheet of paper. This was 
done to add a psychological advantage of brevity that would induce 
lawyers to do the survey during a short break instead of procrastinat-
ing. The use of legal-sized paper allowed a maximum number of questions 
while still retaining the psychological advantage of being "just a one-
page questionnaire." 
Demographics 
Characteristics of Pittsburg County 
Pittsburg County is located in southeastern Oklahoma. A four-lane 
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turnpike, two u. S. highways, and four state highways cross the county 
with most of them going through or near the county seat of McAlester. 
The distribution of occupations and earnings for the county shows 
workers to be most commonly craftsmen, clerical workers, service 
workers, or operators of machinery other than for transportation pur-
poses (see Table I). The census data showed a lower percentage of 
technical workers and professionals, with only 10.66 percent of the 
county's labor force in such occupations. Much of the economic activity 
in the county centered around McAlester. One-half of the. county's 
workers in all areas except transportation operators, farm-related 
workers, and craftsmen/foremen were tound to live in McAlester. 17 Part 
of those who were not listed as a part of the McAlester work force may 
actually have worked there, however. Many part-time farmers and 
ranchers commute to and from McAlester jobs from widely-dispersed rural 
areas. The county's 1970 median income for families was $6,690, con-
siderably lower than the county's mean income for families which was 
reported as $7,615. Of all households in the county, 27.6 percent had 
18 
annual incomes below poverty levels. Except for McAlester, all other 
towns in Pittsburg County are small. Only Hartshorne, Quinton, and 
Krebs have populations over 1,000. 19 
McAlester's six major employers are The Army Ammunition Plant with 
932 employees, Charles Komar and Sons (lingerie) with 450 employees, 
the Polson Rubber Company with 152 employees, Rockwell International 
with 150 employees, Henson-Kickernick (lingerie) with 128 employees, 
. . . 20 
and Elsing Manufacturing Company (sportswear) with 126 employees. · 
This accounts, in part, for the large percentage of craftsmen/foremen 
and service workers reported in Table I. 
TABLE I 
OCCUPATION AND EARNINGS, TOTAL EMPLOYED 
16 YEARS AND OVER, IN PERCENTAGE 
Occupation 
Professional, Technical & 
Kindred Workers 
Managers & Administrators 
(except farm) 
Sales Workers 
Clerical & Kindred Workers 
Craftsmen, Foremen & Kindred 
Workers 
Operatives (except 
Transportation) 
Transportation Equipment 
Operatives 
Laborers (except farm 
Farmers and Farm Managers 
Farm Laborers & Farm Foreman 
Service (except Private 
Households) 
Private Household Workers 
Pittsburg 
County 
% 
10.66 
9.39 
6.23 
15.71 
18.31 
12.84 
4.88 
4.11 
1.94 
.75 
13.53 
1.66 
100.01 
*Totals add to more than 100% due to rounding 
McAlester 
% 
11.59 
10.53 
7.42 
18.15 
16.10 
I 
13.13 
3.22 
3.22 
.66 
.26 
13.74 
1.99 
100.01 
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McAlester 
as a % 
of county 
57.15 
58.98 
62.65 
60.73 
46.20 
53.74 
34.72 
41.19 
17.83 
17.98 
53.36 
62.94 
-0-
Source: U. s. Bureau of the Cens~s, Characteristics of the Population, 
Vol. 1, Part 38, PP• 278, 337. 
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McAlester amenities also tend to make it the focus of county 
dwellers. It has the only hospital in the area, having a 190-bed ca-
pscity. Three miles from the McAlester city limits is the county's 
only airport. The town also sports a vocational~technical school, 
b . . . . d f h d. 21 r1ng1ng 1n commut1ng stu ents rom t e surroun 1ng area. Family in-
come for the area varied sharply by type of work. For all families, 
the mean wage or salary was $7,650 per year. For those with non-farm 
related self-employed businesses, this was considerably higher with 
mean income at $8,487 per year. At the opposite end of the scale, the 
mean income for self-employed farmers was found to be only $3,723 per 
year. The mean public assistance or public welfare income for McAlester 
was reported as $1,247 per year. All workers not in the above cate-
gories were listed as "other" and had a reported mean yearly income of 
$3,473 per year. From the McAlester area, 24.4 percent of all house-
holds were reported as having incomes less than the estimated poverty 
22 level. Unemployment for the area fluctuated throughout the year with 
a yearly average of 9.62 percent (see table II). 
In Hartshorne, the second largest town in the area, only two major 
manufacturers operate--Oklahoma Aerotronics, an electronics firm, em-
ploying 316 area people and the Dolese Brothers Co., a crushed lime-
23 
stome business with only 20 employees. No income statistics similar 
to those available for McAlester could be obtained for Hartshorne, due 
to its size. 
Pittsburg County Lawyer Demographics 
All lawyers in Pittsburg County, with only one exception, prac-
ticed in McAlester. The one exception had a small office in Hartshorne. 
TABLE II 
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES FOR PITTSBURG COUNTY 
BY MONTH FOR 1978* 
Unemployment 
Month Rate Month 
January 10.4 July 
February 12.3 August 
March 11.4 September 
April 10.8 October 
May 12.4 November 
June 11.4 December 
*Revised figures 
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Unemployment 
Rate 
10.4 
8. S'- .-
6.6 
6.3 
7.2 
7.7 
Source: Oklahoma Employment Service, McAlester Labor Market Review, 
March, 1978, through February, 1979. 
Also, legal practice in Pittsburg County was found to be male dominated 
--no women lawyers were currently practicing. 
Of those responding to the survey, the following personal charac-
teristics were found. First, 91 percent of the respondents reported 
affiliation with the Democratic party, while only 8 percent reported 
Republic ~Efiliation. 24 Forty~eight percent of the respondents re-
ported that they had been raised in a small urban environment, .followed 
most closely by 39 percent who came from rural hometowns. Only nine 
percent reported a suburban rearing, and only four percent reported a 
large urban background. Forty-two percent of the respondents were 
under 40 years of age, and 46 percent were from 40 to 59 •. Only thirteen 
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percent of the sample reported being over 60 ye~rs old. This may have 
been caused by either death or retirement of such attorneys. 
Another demographic area examined was law school background and 
length of service in the county. Seventy~nine percent of the respond-
ents said they attended an in-state law school, which left only 21 per-
cent receiving their education from out-of-state schools. Sixty-seven 
pe.rcent of the responding lawyers graduated from law school after 1960, 
25 percent from 1940-1959, and only eight percent before 1940. There 
was some lag time seen in the middle age category between graduating 
f.rom law school and setting up a practice in Pittsburg County, however. 
Seventy-one percent of the respondents set up practice after 1960, 
leaving only 21 percent from 1940-1959, and the same eight percent be-
fore 1940. 
The final an•a of lawyer demographics involved the lawyer's po-
sition within the legal field. Concerning type of practice~ 48 percent; 
or eleven, reported working in a partnership; 39 percent, or nine~ in a 
solo practice; and 13 percent, or 3, in a law firm. The high incidence 
of partnerships may be an economizing measure allowing two or more solo 
practitioners to cut down on overhead by sharing office space and secre-
. 1 25 tar1a. costs. Legal specializations were widely dispersed, with the 
largest category being probate and estates. The results are presented 
in Table III. Incomes of the surveyed lawyers proved to be as dispersed 
as their areas of specialization. Results are displayed in Table IV. 
Such high incomes account in part for the McAlester mean family income 
for the non-farm, self-employed being so much higher than any of the 
other income means. 
TABLE III 
RESPONDENT'S FIELD OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION* 
Area of Specialization Percent of Survey 
None 5.0 
Real Estate 15.0 
Probate/Estates 20.0 
Personal Injury 15.0 
Civil 15.0 
Criminal 5.0 
Litigation 15.0 
Corporate/Commercial 10.0 
TOT/\L 100.0 
*Adjusted frequencies, missing data equals four ~ases 
Soutce: Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey, 1979 
TABLE IV 
RESPONDENT'S ANNUAL INCOME"'( 
Income Level Percent of Survey 
$15,000 to $25,000 23.8 
$25,001 to $35,000 33.3 
$15,001 to $45,000 28.6 
$45,001 and over 14.3 
TOT/\L 100.0 
-/(Adjusted frequencies, missing data equals three cases 
Source: Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey, 1979 . 
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n 
1 
3 
4 
3 
3 
1 
3 
2 
20 
n 
5 
7 
6 
3 
21 
The Pittsburg County Har Association 
Lawyer Referral Servic~ 
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The Pittsburg County Bar Association has established a Lawyer Re-
ferral Service in McAlester. The referral service has no permanent 
olfice, and is always performed out of the current Pittsburg County Bar 
Association President's private law office. No advertisement of the 
service is undertaken. Any person asking for referral from the service 
first must establish indigency by filling out a form describing his or 
her assets and liabilities. Once it has been seen that the eligibility 
requirements have been met, the person is referred to a private attorney 
who is then contacted and informed that the client meets the Lawyer Re-
ferral poverty requirements. From this point on; the decision to charge 
a low fee or to charge no fee is made solely by the lawye:r. Mr. Neal, 
the Bar Association President, said that most of the people who come to 
the office asking for a referral were sent there from the various social 
services agencies. 26 This may be caused by a lack of awareness on the 
part of the rest of the community that the service exists. 
Conclusion 
Everything has now been discussed that was considered necessary for 
examining the Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey results in regard to the 
three ,hypotheses and many subhypotheses developed in this chapter. By 
this point, the reader should have attained competency in the background 
theory and demographics necessary to make an analysis of the following 
data meaningful. 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF THE PITTSBURG COUNTY LAWYERS SURVEY 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a set of hypotheses was developed to de-
scribe the expected nature of pro bono services in the small-town-based 
county. Studies of pro bono activities in both urban and rural areas 
were used to develop these hypothesis. From these earlier studies a 
system of maximization of retu~ns was seen to de~elop, because of the 
legal profession's dependence on profit. This dependence was also seen 
to lead to specialization in the more lucrative fields of legal prac-
tice, and eventually, to institutionalization of these fields. Back-
ground into the characteristics and needs of each of the actors in 
these situations was provided to help explain how these developments 
might take place. 
With tl1is background, an analysis of the data derived from the 
Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey will now be undertaken. Each hypothesis 
or subhypothesis will be examined in turn to determine whether the data 
will support or refute its contention. When this is finished, conclu-
sions will be drawn concerning the implications for future organized 
and unorganized legal aid effort coordination. 
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The Economic Base 
Institutionalization and Pro 
Bono Cases 
For a thorough study of an economically based system, it was first 
necessary to determine if the dependence on profit had in fact led to 
the expected specialization and institutionalization of lawyers' legal 
practices. This was the question addressed in subhypothesis la. It 
predicted that because of the economic dependence on the private bar: 
la. Regular and pro bono practices should be found to deal 
with similar kinds of legal problems. 
From the available data, this cannot be seen to be the case. Table V 
shows the mean percentages of time spent in vari11>us categories of pro 
bono work by the Pittsburg Courity lawyers. Of these mean percentages, 
thecategories of domestic relations with 69.32 percent, and property 
related with 17.01 percent show the strongest responses. These are· 
types of practices that did compare to types found in the lawyers' 
regular practice. The mean percentages of service reported were quite 
different between the pro bono and regular practice·s, however. This 
diffetence will be discussed more thoroughly under subhypothesis lb. 
Another similarity between the two tables was seen in the civil liber-
ties categories of both the pro bono and regular practices. In both 
instances lawyers reported no mean percentage of their practice spent 
on any civil liberties problems. Not quite as strong as the civil 
liberties absence in both pro bono and regular practices was the simi-
larly low mean percentages of personal injury cases performed by the 
lawyers in each of the practices. 
TABLE v 
MEAN PERCE~~AGE OF TIME DEVOTED TO VARIOUS TYPES OF 
LEGAL SERVICES PROVIDED PRO BONO CLIENTS 
Consumer and 
Employment Related Administrative 
6.14% 2.05% 
Housing 
2.96% 
Civil 
Liberties 
0.0% 
*Table totals to less than 100% due to rounding error 
Source: Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey, 1979 n = 22 
Domestic 
Relations 
69.32% 
Property 
Related 
17.01% 
Personal 
Injury 
1. 14/o 
Other Total 
1.36% 99.98%* 
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Regardless of the comparisons that did exist, the differences be~ 
tween the pro bono and regular practices were most notable (see Table 
VI). The lawyers did in fact report serving pro bono clients in con-
sumer and employment related areas a mean of 6.14 percent. No compar-
able category of the lawyers' regular practice explained this. Also, 
administrative and housing problems were dealt with in the lawyers' pro 
bono practices, although there were no similar categories in their 
regular practices. Because of these differences found between the pro 
bono and regular practices of the lawyers it must be concluded that they 
were doing non-institutionalized services for the poor. The extent to 
which these services were being done was indeterminable from the data, 
however. The importance here lies in the difference from what was ex-
! 
pected in previous studies. Two possible explanations for this phe-
nomena were the lack of other organized sources of legal services avail-
able to the poor, and the closer social contacts found in the smaller 
town than in the city. Both the Mayhew and the Lochner study took 
place in cities that had some form of organized legal aid available to 
the poor. Lawyers there.may have simply deferred such services to 
these agencies. Furthermore, the increased closeness in the small town 
conununity may have fostered a willingness among the lawyers to go beyond 
their regular practices and serve the poor in some cases that were not 
conunonly performed by them for paying customers. 
Similarity Between Time Spent in 
Lawyers' Pro Bono and Regular 
Practices 
Another area of analysis concerning the pro bono and regular 
.. 
Domestic 
Business Relations 
22.67% 11.90% 
Source: Pittsburg 
TABLE VI 
l-1EAN PERCENTAGE OF TIME DEVOTED TO VARIOUS TYPES OF 
LEGAL SERVICES PERFORMED IN THE LAWYERS' 
TOTAL PRACTICE 
Civil No Fee/ Property Personal 
Liberties Criminal Low Fee Related Tax Injury 
0.0% 8.96% 4.69% 33.76% 1.25% 7.88% 
County Lawyers Survey, 1979 n = 24 
Civil 
Practice Other Total 
2. 71% . 6.18% 100% 
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pra~tices of lawyers in Pittsburg County concerned the degree of simi-
larity between the amounts of the various types of services performed 
in each of the types of practices. It would be predicted, if in fact 
the 1awyers' pro bono practices were dependent on the types of ser-
vices provided for regular clients, that: 
1. In their regular and pro bono practices, lawyers should 
be found to spend similar amounts of time on similar 
types of legal problems. 
This was not evidenced by the data. The largest disperity was found 
in the domestic relations categories of both the pro bono and regular 
practices. In their regular practices, lawyers only performed a mean 
of 11.90 percent of their time in the domestic area. In contrast to 
their regular practice, the lawyers performed 69.32 mean percent of 
their. pro bono practice in the 'domestic area. Similarly, large differ-
ences were seen between the property-related categories of the pro bono 
and regular practices. The lawyers' regular practices showed a mean of 
33.76 percent, while their pro bono practices showed a mean of only 
17.01 percent. It would seem obvious from these differences between 
the mean percentages of the two practice types that the lawyers were 
spending their time on different services for the poor than they were 
for their regular clients. However, it cannot be determined from the 
data whether these were the only types of services the lawyers were 
willing to perform for the clients, regardless of what problems the poor 
brought to the lawyers; or whether these were the only types of prob-
lems that the poor brought to the lawyer. The only conclusion that 
could be derived from the available data was that there was a differ-
ence of mean percentages between similar types of services performed by 
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lnwycrs Ln their pro bono and regular practJccs, thus disproving the 
hypothesized relationship. 
Handling of Pro Bono Cases 
The fact that lawyers did report spending some of their overall 
practice in performing no fee or low fee services leads to the third 
subhypothesis. It was to be expected that economic dependence on the 
private bar should result in: 
lc. Pro bono cases handled for the poor will be resolved 
quickly, allowing the lawyer to return his paying 
clients. 
Jt would be expected in a system with profit as one of the strongest 
incentives, that the lawyer like any other good businessman would tend 
I 
to spend little time on free or below-regular fee services (see Table 
VII). As would be expected if this was indeed the case, advice, the 
least time-consuming of the categories, ranked the highest of all the 
categories, with lawyers reporting an average of 50.71 percent of their 
pro bono cases as having been handled in this manner. Since litigation 
was the most time-consuming of the alternatives, its high percentage of 
average time spent was an unexpected occurrence in an economically-
based system. This finding was especially unexpected since Lochner in. 
his Erie County study reported no litigation at all in pro bono work. 
Since organized legal services were available in Eri.e County, and there 
were none in Pittsburg County, this difference may have been accounted 
for in part by the pro bono lawyers having to spend time on the cases 
that would have ordinarily been fulfilled by organized legal aid~ 
When combining the results of the three subhypotheses of hypothe-
sis number one, it was clear there was considerable difference in the 
TABLE VII 
AVERAGE PERCENTAGE OF PRO BONO CASES 
RESOLVED BY VARIOUS METHODS 
Method of Resolution 
Advice only 
Negotiation 
Litigation 
Referral to social services 
Referral to a specialized lawyer 
Administrative headings 
Other 
TOTAL 
*Table totals to less than 100% due to rounding 
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Average Percentage 
50.71 
12.24 
21.43 
8.33 
2.52 
1.43 
3.33 
99. 99~': 
Source: Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey, 1979 n 21 
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pro bono practice of lawyers i.n Pittsburg County from that found by 
Lochner in the urban study. Lawyers performed some noninstitutional-
ized services for their pro bono clients that was not expected from 
the previous literature. Similarly, the resolution of such problems, 
although showing strongly on the less time-consuming category of ad-
vice only, did also include the most time-consuming categ1ry of litiga-
i tion to an extent onpredicted from any previous study. F~rthermore, · 
in the services that were similar to their regular practice, the 
lawyers spent time in greatly dissimilar proportions than in their pay-
ing practices. These findings would tend to indicate that the lawyers 
of Pittsburg County were filling the needs of the poor beyond just per-
forming regular practice services for them. The extent to which these 
needs of the poor beyond just performing regular practice services for 
them. The extent to which these needs were met could not be derived 
from this data, however. Nevertheless, the fact that there was seen to 
be so much difference between the urban and small town in the area of 
types of serv.i ces provided would tend to give credence to the argument 
that there was more neighborliness and concern in the small town, prob-
ably deriving from the social closeness and increased conmunications 
available. 
Promotional Techniques and Advertising 
The second hypothesis concerned promotional techniques and adver-
tising. Specifically, it said: 
2. The use of practice building and maintaining promotional 
techniques, as well as legal advertising advocacy should 
vary by the lawyer's economic situation. 
First, the previous description of the types of techniques a lawyer 
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used shoultl have varied by type of practice, because of the differing 
needs of lawyers in different economic situations. Chapter III showed 
that solo practitioners or partners in the city tended to choose tech--
niques which might help them make needed client contacts. This helped 
them build or maintain their practices. On the other hand, the firm 
lawyer generally was found to favor social role fulfillment to maintain 
his good graces in the eyes of the co11111unity. He or she did not have 
the building and maintaining drive found in the solo practitioner and 
law partner. The rural lawyer also tended to primarily fulfill social 
expectations in his choice of techniques. This was also presumed to be 
from a lack of need for new clients because of low lawyer-to-population 
ratios. 
In Pittsburg County a trend different in some ways to the urban 
studies was evident (see Table VIII). Fifty-eight percent, or fourteen 
Jawycrs, acknowledged using one or more of the techniques. Of these 
solo practitioners were the most active in every type of promotional 
technique studied, except running for office, where there was a tie with 
partners in average percentage used. Partnership lawyers showed the 
next greatest propensity to use these techniques. This was similar to 
the urban findings. Firm attorneys participated in only two techniques. 
To further his practice, one firm attorney, or 50 percent of those re-
sponding, acknowledged having run for office, and one, again 50 percent, 
sai.d he had joined a business organization. This was directly opposite 
to the urhan findings. Such deviations from the urban studies may be 
caused by stronger small town social expectations to perform political 
roles, or from a desire to socialize with the local business interests. 
Similarly, firm attorneys also deviated from the urgan studies in 
TABLE VIII 
DIFFERENCES IN PROMO'flONS. USED BY PRACTICE TYPE, 
IN PERCENTAGE OF J~WYERS WHO USED PROMOTIONAL 
TECHNIQUES 
Technique Used (I).) Didn't Use (n) 
RAN FOR OFFICE. 
Solo Practitioner 66.7 (4) 33.3 (2) 
Partner 66.7 (4) 33.3 (2) 
Firm 50.0 (1) 50.0 (1) 
JOINED A BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
Solo Practitioner 66.7 (4) 33.3 (2) 
Partner 50.0 (3) 50.0 (3) 
Firm 50.0 (1) 50.0 (1) 
GAVE TIME TO A CHARITABLE 
ORGANIZATION 
I 
Solo Practitioner 83.3 (5) 16.7 (1) 
Partner 66.7 (4) ;33.3 (2) 
Firm o.o (0) 100.0 (2) 
BECAME MORE ACTIVE IN THE 
CHURCH 
Solo Practitioner 66.7 (4) 33.3 (2) 
Partner 33.3 (2) 66.7 (4) 
Firm o.o (0) 100.0 (2) 
MORE TIME TO I~.RA TERNAL 
OHGANIZATIONS 
Solo Practitiorier 100.0 (6) o.o (0) 
Partner 50.0 (3) 50.0 (3) 
Firm o.o (0) 100.0 (2) 
Source: Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey, 1979 n = 14 
101 
Total (n) 
100.0 (6) 
100.0 (6) 
100.0 (2) 
100.0 (6) 
100.0 (6) 
100.0 (2) 
100.0 (6) 
100.0 (6) 
100.0 (2) 
100.0 (6) 
100.0 (6) 
100.0 (2) 
100.0 (6) 
100.0 (6) 
100.0 (2) 
102 
preference for giving time to charitable organizations to promote their 
practice. Although charitable work was the most coJIIDon promotional 
technique for the urban firm attorney, Pittsburg County firm attorneys 
Jid not cite it at all. 
Annther interesting point shown in the tables concerns the areas 
most likely to be favored by solo practitioners who used practice build-
ing techniques. Eighty-three percent acknowledged having given time to 
charitable organizations. This also was reversed from the practices 
reported by the solo practitioners in Lochner's study. Furthermore, all 
the solo practitioners who used promotional techniques reported that 
they gave time to fraternal organizations. This was in contrast to 
only 50 percent of the partners and none of the firm lawyers citing the 
technique. Apparently the fraternal organizations were seen by the 
solo practitioners as much more helpful to their practice, but no clues 
to why this was the case were provided by the data. 
When examining the types of promotional techniques used by lawyers 
and to what extent they were used, little difference could be found be-
tween the two income levels. As can be seen in Table IX, similar pat-
terns were found between the lower income and higher income lawyers in 
their use of promotional techniques. Both groups of lawyers who used 
any promotional techniques tended to report similarly high percentages 
in all categories. 
As would be expected, however, the extent of promotional techniques 
usage among all lawyers did vary by type of practice. Solo practitioners 
were found to use consistently more types of techniques, further de-
scribing their need for promotion of their practices. Once again part-
nerships followed thi.s lead, with no firm attorney using more than one 
1'ABLE IX 
DIFFERENCES IN PROMOTIONS USED BY LAWYERS' 
INCOME IN PERCENTAGE OF LAWYERS WHO 
USED PROMOTIONAL TECHNIQUES 
103 
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of the available techniques. This furthers the assumption that firm 
attorneys felt some need to meet community role expectations by taking 
on at least one sueh activity. Their solo practitioner counterparts 
seemed to display much more need to bring in and retain clients (see 
Table X). Surprisingly, however, the percentages of those who used 
none of the techniques were almost exactly the same for each type of 
practice. 
Even though most lawyers did use some type of promotional technique, 
there were several lawyers who said they did not need such techniques 
to attract a clientele. The most common response given, 60 percent, or· 
6 times, was that their reputation for quality service brought them 
clients. This was not explained by degree of establishment of a 
I 
lawyer's practice, since lawyers were scattered between both new and es-
tab] ished lawyers. Simil:irly, it did not mask answers of "joined a 
law firm," the second most frequent response. All who reported a repu-
tati.on for quality were solo practitioners or partners. Some answer 
maybe found in lawyers' perceived differences between city and rural 
law practice. Two answers pointed out an increased communication in 
the town. This was seen as the abili.ty to know others in the legal. 
profession better, including judges; and the ability to make a name 
for oneself faster •. Combined, the t.wo categories represent 27 percent 
ol the total response. This would explain why the ability to build a 
reputation without promotional techniques could extend to both new and 
established lawyers. 
The second answer to why a lawyer had no need to attract a clientele . 
through promotional techniques involved joining a law firm. Four law-
yers, or 40 percent of those who did not need promotion, g~ve this 
Type of 
Practice None One 
% (n) % 
Solo 33.3 (3) o.o 
Partnership 36.4 (4} 27.3 
Firm 33.3 (1) 66.7 
*Totals do not sum to 100% due to 
Source: Pittsburg County Lawyers 
TABLE X 
EXTENT OF PROMOTIONAL TECHNIQUES USED 
BY PRACTICE TYPE, IN PERCENTAGES 
Number of Technigues Used 
Two Three Four 
(n) % (n) % (n) % (n) 
(0) 11.1 (1) 22.2 (2) o.o (0) 
(3) 9.1 (1) 9.1 (l) 9.1 (1) 
(2) o.o (0) 0.0 (0) o.o (0) 
rounding 
Survey, 1979 n = 24 
Five Total* 
% (n) % (n) 
33.3 (3) 99.9 ( 9) 
9.1 (1) 100.1 (11) 
0.0 (0) 100.0 ( 3) 
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response. One lawyer indicated another firm member's reputation gained 
as a politician brought them enough business. Others noted the general 
prestige and sufficient clientele of the. firm precluded ·any such need. 
The expected support for legal advertising by lower income and 
non-firm lawyers was not found. Almost all of the lawyers were skepti-
cal about its ability to help, or felt it would directly harm the legal 
profession. The only trend found by type of practice was that partner-
ship lawyers seemed somewhat more negative. Unexpectedly, the only 
lawyer who gave a positive answer ("hope it helps") was of the upper in~ 
come and firm categories. Forty percent of the lower income lawyers 
thought it might be of minimal effect, or 4, while only 20 percent, or 
one, of the higher income lawyers responded this way. One explanation 
for these negative results is probably the common belief that legal ad-
vertising would lead to abuse, misrepresentation, and loss of profes-
sionalism. Such a belief may be socialized into the lawyer's percep-.. 
tions of professionalism by both law schools and more established 
community lawyers. Another possibility is that few of the lawyers ex-
pect advertising to happen in McAlester, regardless of the reduction in 
the ban. With the amount of adverse feeling evident in this study, 
community lawyers would probably not willingly accept as a colleague 
someone who broke the tradition and advertised. Regardless of why the 
lawyers were so negative, it seems that legal advertising will not be 
regarded as a possible method for increasing a private practice in Pitts-
burg County in the foreseeable future. 
In conclusion, hypothesis number two was in sorneways supported, 
and in other ways, refuted by the data. Striking differences were ex-
pressed in types and amounts and in promotional techniques used by the 
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l:•wy(!rs depending on their type of legal practice. This was not the 
case, however, when lawyers' income was examined. Both income levels 
varied in much the same way for all the techniques examined. For those 
lawyers who used no promotional techniques, similar percentages were 
reported within each of the categories. The most common reason the 
lawyers gave for this lack of need was that their reputation was enough 
to bring them clients. This ability to be well-known enough to estab-
lish such a reputation without promotional techniques was attributed to 
i.ncreased communication within the small town. The second most common 
reason for not needing to use promotional techniques was because the 
attorney joined a law firm. This is consistent with the previous analy-
sis since law firm members used less promotional techniques in every 
I 
area. Because of the findings just mentioned, the hypothesis may only 
! 
be accepted in the more limited sense of economic differences by prac-
tice, not by income. The economic difference between attitudes on ad-
vertising were directly refuted by the data. Lawyers in Pittsburg 
County tended to all be skeptical of the use of advertising as a promo-
tiona] technique. 
The System of Economic Reciprocity For 
Pro Bono Service 
Differences in Amount ·Of Pro 
Bono Services 
The first area of consideration in hypothesis three is the amount 
of pro bon~ services that lawyers do. Since the system of re~iprocity 
used to·maxi.mize returns on pro.bono services should be found to exist 
in the sm;tll town Lt could be hypothesized that: 
3a. Differences in amounts of pro bono activity performed 
by lawyers should be found to depend on their economic 
situation. 
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To determine if such a difference existed, an examination of the number 
of no fee and low fee clients reported and the ~awyers' policies of who 
to accept on such a basis will be considered. 
The amount-of-service variables for both the no fee and low fee 
cases had a very low response rate. This, once again, probably is de-
rived from lawyers not keeping records on this type of service. How-
ever, for those who did respond, there does not appear to be a notable 
trend. For no fee work, ·both income levels of lawyers tended to perform 
about the same number of cases per year. Low fee cases did show some 
slight difference by lawyers' income, however. Surprisingly there was 
a tendency for higher income lawyers to do slightly more at all levels, 
except for one lower income lawyer who reported doing sixty-eight or more 
such cases per year. This was more low fee service than any other laW}'er 
performed. This is not the expected pattern since lower income lawyers 
would seem to be more likely to expect some fee if possible to supple-
mcnt their more meager income. One probable explanation is that higher 
income lawyers did more favors for their poorer clients, ~it~ the hope 
that these favors would act as "loss leaders" to bring in more service 
later when the clients were back on their feet. Another possibility is 
that much of the service was performed to please intermediaries who sent 
the client to the higher incom~ lawyer. These possibilities will be 
examined shortly. 
Neither income nor type of practice satisfactorily supported the 
hypothesized relationship. One possible explanation might be expected 
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to be found·in the age of the lawyer performing the pro bono service. 
U would be expected l.n an economically-based model that younger, less 
established lawyers would perform less no fee work and more low fee 
work than older, more established lawyers. This was not evidenced in 
the data, however (see Table XI). Very little differe~ce could be seen 
between younger and middle-aged lawyers. The only major difference 
shown by.age concerned the oldest category of lawyers. These lawyers 
were seen to perform no or very little of either type of service. The 
probable explanation for their not providing such service was that they 
were working in a less active, retirement practice. 
Another indicator of amount of pro bono service performed was the 
lawyers' policy on who they will take on such a basis. The lawyers' in-. 
come showed some difference in their policy, with low income lawyers 
more likely to take only clients sent by the Bar Association Referral 
Service, and higher income lawyers taking more sent by intermediaries 
they knew. This may have shown a stronger incentive,on the part of the 
newer, lower income lawyer to fulfill professional expectations of other 
bar members who would exp.ect them to have more time or maybe more 
need for such cases. Type of practice, however, showed little in the 
way of explaining differences in acceptance policy. 
An interesting trend in the data helped shed more light on pro bono 
policy differences. Policy responses varied within each category by 
length of establishment of practice in Pittsburg County (see Table XII). 
L<iwyers who had established their practices after 1960 were more dis-
criminating than any other group about who they took as pro bono 
clients. Fifty percent, or eight, .reported only accepting a case if 
sent by the Bar Referral Service. This was the largest percentage of 
TABLE XI 
AMOUNT OF NOFEE AND LOW FEE SERVICE, 
BY AGE OF LAWYER 
Amount of Service Lawxer's ~e 
Performed 20 - 39 40 -59 
In Cases Per Year % (n) % (n) 
No Fee Service 
None o.o (0) 14.3 (1) 
1 to 33 57.1 (4) 42.9 (3) 
34 to 67 42.9 (3) 28.6 (2) 
More than 68 o.o (0) 14.3 (1) 
TOTAL'>'' 100.0 (7) 100.1 (7) 
Low Fee Service 
None o.o (0) o.o (0) 
1 to 33 42.9 (3) 57.1 (4) 
34 to 67 42.9 (3) 42.9 (3) 
More than 68 14.3 (l) o.o (0) 
TOTAL•'' 100.1 (7) 100.0 (7) 
;\-Totals do not sum to 100% due to rounding 
Source: Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey, 1979 n = 
110 
60 -89 
~ (n) 
50.0 (1)' 
50.0 (l) 
o.o (0) 
o.o (0) 
100.0 (2) 
100.0 (2) 
0~0 (0) 
o.o (0) 
o.o (0) 
100.0 (2) 
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TABLE XII 
POLICY ON PRO BONO SERVICES, BY ESTABLISHMENT 
OF THE LAWYER'S PRACTICE 
Year Began Practice in Count:y: 
Policy on Pro Bono 1920-1939 194o-1959 
Service % (n) % (n) 
All Who Come 100.0 (1) 40.0 (2) 
Only When Know 
Intermediary 
(includes Bar Re-
ferral Service) o.o (0) 40.0 (2) 
Only When Sent By 
Bar Referral 
Service o.o (0) 20.0 (1) 
TOTAL 100.0 (1) 100.0 (5) 
Source: Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey, 1979 n ::: 22 
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1960-1919 
~ (n) 
6.3 (1) 
43.8 (7) 
50.0 (8) 
100.0 (16) 
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auy pPriod ol esl.abl isluneut that w11s s.o exclusive. As was mentioned 
when discus~dng income, this further backed the premise that younger 
lawyers may have been trying to prove their professionalism to other 
bar members who may have expected them to take a disproportionate share 
of these cases. Another important tendency was for the better estab-
lished to be more inclusive in their acceptance of pro bono cases. This 
probably showed increasingly more indepe.ndence from economic needs' and 
a trend toward more socially expected philanthropic work. The only 
lawyer who reported doing no pro bono work was a solo practitioner in 
the lower income level who said he must deal with only paying clients 
to make ends mf!Ct i:n a reti.rement practice. This was the response of 
anotlwr older lawyer who did not do the survey, but offered the response 
in conversation. 
ln conclusion, the hypothesis contending that amount of pro bono 
service would be determined by the economic situation of the lawyer was 
not strongly supported by the data. One possible explanation for this 
may have been because the question measuring estimated amount of ser-
v .iCE! provided in no fee and low fee areas was poorly responded to by 
the lawyers. rn the analysis of those who did answer, almost no re~ 
lat.ionship was seen by either lawyers' type of practice, ·income or age. 
The most distinct difference in variation among the lawyers on the is-. 
sue was in the area of policy for taking pro bono clients, compared to 
the lawyers' lengths of practice ln Pittsburg County (see Table XII). 
Those who had been in the county the longest were far more lenient in 
their policy on accepting the pro bono case. Conversely, those who had 
pnact i.ct~d i 11 the county for less than twenty years were· far more intent 
on knowing who had sent the client. This backs the hypothesis by 
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suggost.ing the lnwyers newest to Pittsburg County were interested.in the 
intermediary relationship in order to develop such contacts, possibly 
with future paying relationships in mind; or by feeling the need to ful-
fill professional expectations if the intermediary was sent by the Bar 
Referral Setvice •. 
IJifferences in Types of Clients 
Served 
It would be expected that different economically-situated groups 
ol I awy(•rs would take eli fferent types of pro bono clients because of 
their different incentives for doing the work. The system of.recipro-
city used to maximize returns on pro bono services should be found to 
I 
exist in the small town. This shoul~ manifest i~self in: 
Jh. IH fferences in types of clients served by lawyers 
should vary by the lawyer's economic situation. 
This wns seen to be evidenced by the data. Lower income lawyers were 
more likely to perceive their pro bono clients as indigent or chronic-
ally poor. Si.xty-four percent, or seven, of those citing this answer 
wen• of l'h(• lower ineome category, and it composed 70 percent, or 
seven, of all lower income lawyers' responses. The .second most preva-
lent answer for this question was that the pro bono client had merely 
fallen on hard times. Answers here were similar for both incoJDe levels 
with the lower level having a slight lead at 30 percentt or three, and 
the higher close behind with 22 percent, or two. Two higher· income. 
lawyers reported the pro bono client as just being lazy; and another 
high income lawyer mentioned they were either young or old and havi.ng 
troi.tble making ends meet. Almost no difference was seen in the economic 
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u~scrlptlon of tiH' pro bono clients by type of lawyers' practice, with 
at least 50 percent of all types describing the pro bono clients as 
chronically poor or indigent. 
Concerning the pro bono clients' work status, some expected varia-
tion was seen by income of the lawyers responding. Fifty percent of the 
L1wyers in the lower income level reported their pro bono clients were 
unemployed. This answer was quite similar to the answers of higherin-
come lawyers, 43 percent of whom responded that their pro bono clients 
were also unemployed. lfowever, the lower income lawyers were split in 
their answers with 30 percent, or three, reporting their clients were 
employed or temporarily unemployed. This compared to only 14 percent, 
or one, of the upper income lawyers who fell into either of these cate-
1 
gories. This was the expected response. If lawyers were as selective 
in type of client as was previously seen for the lower income lawyers, 
and 1f they had economic interests in building a practice by attracting 
clients through pro bono services, their pro bono clients would be ex-
pect('(l to he more often employed at a low wage or temporarily unemployed. 
In contrast, the higher income lawyers reported their pro bono clients 
were almost always unemployed, or job jumpers. None said such clients 
were ever employed when they came seeking help. It should be noted 
that although lower i.ncome lawyers did have a tendency to have more ell-
ployed or temporarily unmnployed pro bono clients than the higher income 
level lawyer, half of them still found their clients to be unemployed .. 
ft would seem that the lower income lawyer was dealing with .ore of the 
true poverty eases, both employed and unemployed. Many of these were 
prohah I y tho cases n•ft:•rred to them by the Lawyer Referral Service. 
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Arwther ctrt•a of investigation was whether the clients ever re-
turned as p<tylng c ll.tmts. 1 f indeed the lower income lawyers were try-
l.ng to build th<dr J)ractice by serving the poor, it would be assured 
that some would eventually be expected to come back with paying work. 
Higher income lawyers who would be expected to do more service to only 
fulfill social expectations would not be expected to.watch for those 
returning to pay. Also, their intermediary framework of co1111unication · · 
might only have included contacts with a less-likely-to-pay group of 
low fee clients. The above expectations were evident in the Pittsburg 
County replies. Although no lawyers were optimistic about pro bono 
clients becoming paying clients, 91 percent, or ten, of the lower in-
come lawyers reported this did happen on rare occations. Only 67 per-
c1~nt, or six, of tht• upper income lawyers would make such a claim. On 
I 
the other hand, only 9 percent, or one, of the lower income lawyers 
said pro bono clients never came back as paying clients, while 33 per-
cent, or three, of the higher income lawyers made this claim • 
. Hypothesis 3b was generally supported by the data. Far more of 
the lower income lawyers found their clients to be either 1.rtdigent or 
chronically poor than did the upper income lawyers. Similarly, both 
lawyers' income level groups found their pro bono clients to be usually 
unemployed, although the lower income lawyer had a very slight tendency 
to report more employed cUents. This would be the expected case if 
the lawyer was hoping to get some fee, or eventually to bring in a pay-
ing client. Finally, the lower income lawyers also showed more of a 
tendency to have pro bono clients come back as paying clients than did 
the hi.gher income hwyers. This would be the expected case, especially 
if the lower income lawyers were more :interested in building a practice, 
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wh i If! t.ht~ hi.glw r. income l•twyers were working more to please inter-
m<.~diar Jes. 
Differences in Intermediary 
Relationships 
Finally, the third subhypothesis dealt with the intermediary rela-
tionship of the system. The system of reciprocity used to maximiz~ re,.,. 
turns on pro bono services should be found to exist in the small town. 
1'hls should manifest itself ln: 
3c. .IH fferences in types of intermediaries that refer. clients 
to lawyers should vary by the lawyer's economic situa-
tion. 
Surprisingly, higher income lawyers were considerably more likely to 
report that 50 to 100 percent of their clients were sent by inter-
mediaries (see Table XIIl). Lower income lawyers far more regularly 
reported only half or less. This indicated that higher income lawyers 
may have had a more extensive community network informing the poor of 
pro bono services. This could have arisen from a lay connunity's so-
cial expectations that because of the lawyers' higher income, they 
should ·be th(! ont~s burdened more regularly with no fee and low fee 
clients. This was opposite to the findings that the Bar Referral Ser-
vice sent more pro bono.cases to the lower income, less established 
· lawyers. Some indication of differing expectations between the lay 
community and the legal profession members was evident here. 
Another area of analysi.s described who the various lawyers found 
to be serving as an intermediary (see Table XIV). Although widely dis.;. 
persed among the four categories, there di.d see111 to be a general trend 
among the responses. Firm attorneys only reported personal contacts of 
Income 
$35,000 or Less 
More Than $35,000 
TABLE XIII 
PERCENTAGE OF CLIENTS SENT BY INTERMEDIARIES, 
BY LAWYERS 1 INCOME 
%of Clients Sent by·Intermediaries 
None 1 - 50 · 50-100 Don 1 t Day 
% (n) % (n) % {n) % (n) 
9.1 (1) 
o.o (0) 
63.6 (7) 
12.5 (1) 
9.1 (1) 
so.o {4) 
18.2 (2) 
37.5 (3) 
Source: Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey, 1979 n = 19 
Total 
% (n) 
100.0 ( 11) 
100.0 ( 8) 
-
-
..... 
TABLE XIV 
WHO SERVED AS INTERMEDIARIES, BY TYPE OF PRACTICE 
IN PERCENTAGE 
Type of 
Practice 
Solo Practitioner 
Partnership 
Firm 
Lawyers' 
Personal 
Contacts· 
% (n) 
14.3 (1) 
33.3 (3) 
33.3 (1) 
Who Served As 
The Poor's 
Personal 
Contacts 
'7. (n) 
14.3 (1) 
11.1 ( 1) 
o.o (0) 
*Totals do not sum to 100% due to rounding 
Source: Pittsburg County Lawyers Survey, 1979 
Intermediaries 
Paying Institutional 
Clients Sources 
'7. (n) % (n) 
57.1 (4) 14.3 (1) 
22.2 (2) 33.3 (3) 
0.0 (0) 66.7 (2) 
n = 19 
Total* 
% (n) 
100.0 (7) 
99.9 (9) 
100.0 (3) 
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theirs, or community insti.tut.ions as sending them no fee or low fee 
clients. Both of the two firm lawyers reporting institutional contacts 
cited social workers as having sent them their clients, as opposed to 
the Lawyer Referral Service. This was in keeping with the earlier find-
ing that the Lawyer Referral Service tended to send the referrals to 
younger, less-established lawyers. Partners showed more intermediaries 
that were personally connected with themselves than did the solo prac-
titioner. For solo practitioners the most common intermediary relation..; 
ship was with their paying clients. In contrast to the solo practi-
tioner, the roost common response for the lower income lawyer was the 
poor's personal contac:ts. Other income responses were too greatly 
scatter(~d to be useful for analysis. 
ln agreement with the response by lower income lawyers that the 
poor's personal contacts served as intermediaries, 70 percent, or .seven, 
of the lower income lawyers saw their intermediaries as being more like . 
the poor in socio-economic status. Only 20 percent of these lawyers 
found them to be similar to themselves in status. Higher income levels 
saw intermediaries as bei.ng more like the poor 50 percent of the time, 
while 33 percent, or two, saw them as being in-between. This may have 
indicated that higher income lawyers were performing services for fair-
ly established businessmen, though not of as high an economic status as 
tht~Jr own. necause of .the likelihood that a large percentage of upper 
incorn(~ lawyers' pro bono c 1 ients would be sent to the• by intet"'ledi-
aries, this may have been a partial explanation of the differences in 
the intermediaries' status. 
In summary, hypothesis Jc tended to be generally supported. The 
lawyers' income level did show marked difference in the frequency of 
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intermediary contacts reported. The higher income lawyers reported a 
considerably higher percentage of their pro bono clients being sent to 
them by intermediaries. This was in keeping with the findings concern-
ing hypothesis 3b. There it was found that the upper income lawyers 
were more skeptical than the ]ower income lawyers about the pro bono 
client returning as a paying client. It was concluded the upper in-
come Lawyers may have been more interested in taking the type cases 
that. would please an intermediary rather than those who might one day 
becomt.• a paying c licnt. The hypothesis was also supported by the 
types of intermediaries that sent pro bono clients to the lawyers as 
compared to the lawyers' type of practice. The solo practitioner 
seemed to be far more likely to receive pro bono clients from paying 
I 
clients than by any other means. These may have been the clients that 
the sol.o practitiom~r lawyers developed through the promotional tech-
ni.ques they undertook in the communi.ty. The partnership lawyers varied 
considerably between the various types of intermediaries, reporting 
that they received some pro bono clients from all sources of inter-
mc~diarics. f;'lrm attorn<~ys, however, only received pro bono clients 
from soclal workers or personal contacts. This may have·shown a ful-
fi l1mcnt o[ social expt~ctations that the firm lawyers perfonaed when 
they took such cases. 
Conclusion 
Analysis has shown that some of the hypotheses were supported by 
the data while others were rejected. The hypothesized hastitutionali-
zation of legal servil~es to the extent that the divergent proble•s of 
the poor were ignored was root found in Pittsburg County. The lawyers 
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here reported spending t hne on pro bono cases in different ways than 
they did In their regular practices, as well as perfonaing SOIM! ser-
vi.c<•s for ttw poor in quite disproportionate mean percentages to the 
amounts performed in their regular practices. Lawyers also were 
found to not simply provide the quickest services to the pro bono cases 
in order to return to their paying clients more quickly. In some situ-
atious the lawyers were willing to go into litigation for the pro. bono 
c 1 ient. Thls was quite different than the urban findings by Lochner. 
ln no instance did any urban lawyer surveyed litigate a pro bono case. 
Second, the lawyers in Pittsburg County were found to have some 
hypothesized variation by economic situation in their choice of pro-
motional techniques, as was predicted by hypothesis two. The lawyers 
I 
did show a marked difference i~ types of pro.otional techniques usedas 
well as to the extent to which they were used, by the ·lawyers' type·of 
practice. Despite this difference in practice type, lawyers' income 
level quit:e surprisingly showed almost no differences between the types 
of services or amounts used by the lower and upper income lawyers. An-
other unexpected finding was that all lawyers were found to be generally 
skeptical about the practice of legal advertising. Almost no differ-
ence was found in this skepticism, even among the lower income lawyers 
who would be most expected to benefit from its use. 
Finally, in hypothesiS three, amount of pro bono s.ervices per"" 
formed, charactt~r.istics of pro bono clients, and characteristics of the 
intermediaries were also hypothesized to vary by economic situation. 
No support could be found for economic variation in the a.ount of ser-
vice given pro bono clients e;xcept as was explained by the nU1'11ber of 
years the lawyer had practiced in Pi.ttsburg County c011pared to his:. 
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poI it- y on accept! ng pro bono c I i ents. Uere the more established lawyers 
were set~n to be increasingly more leni.ent in whom they would accept as 
pro bono cli.cnts, probably i.n keeping with their no longer needing to 
hui.Jd a pr;H:tice, so much <'lS maintain one by fulfilling social expecta_; 
lions. The characterJsti.es of the pro bono clients were, however, seen 
to vary hy the economic ~ituation of the lawyer. Lower income lawyers 
't 
were illOre ·likely to have mentioned that some of their pro bono clients 
were either employed or only temporarily unemployed than did the higher 
income lawyers. The lower income lawyers also acknowledged a greater 
possibility that their pro bono cli.ents might sometimes come back as 
paying cl i.ents than did the higher i.ncome lawyer. This was explained 
as the tendency for the higher income lawyer to be more interested in 
. ' I 
pleasing intermediaries than in building their practices. Finally, the 
inU•rmedL1rles of the groups were seen to vary by the economic situa-
t ion o I the I awyr! rs. II i .. glw r i neome lawyers were seen to have reported 
more irate nnedi a ry-sent pro bono <: lients than did the lower income 
lawyers. Types of intermediaries also varied between the lawyers in 
diflerent types of practices. The solo practitioner was found to gen-
crally have more paying clients functioning as their intermediaries 
than any other of the categori.e~. Firm attorneys reported different 
findings. They rc-~ported social workers or personal contacts as their 
most eommon categories of 1nterrnedi.aries. Partnership lawyers ac-
knowlt•dged som<! i ntermed [aries from all the categories. 
After (~stabl ishing the existence of an econ0111ically-bases systea 
i.n the small town, llnd havin~ described i.ts general characteristics 
;tnd d1 ffprences as compared to the urban studies, conclusions .. y nov 
be drawn concerning the pro bono system's ability to be incorporated 
with organized leg.1l aid programs. This is the purpose of the final 
ch;tpter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR COORDINATION OF PRO BONO 
SERVICES WITH ORGANIZED LEGAL AID 
Many unexpected differences were found between the small town and 
the urban studies. It was expected from the urban studies that the 
cases performed for the pro bono clients would only be quicker versions 
of services common to the lawyers' regular practice, but the small town 
lawyers performed dissimilar services in much less expedient manners 
I 
for their pro bono clients. It was also expected from the urban stud-
ies' findings that more no fee services would be performed by higher 
income lawyers; but there was no important difference in amounts of 
no fee and low fee services found by the lawyers' income level in the 
small town study. Furthermore, the type of client taken by the urban 
lawyer was found to vary hy type of practice, while in the small town 
there was almost no difference found here. Finally, the expected inter-
medi.ary relationships found in the urban studies were complet-ely re-
versed ln the small town study. 
The most inlportant similarity between the urban study and the small 
town study, however, was that the economic incentive for providing pro 
bono services was apparent in past studies. Promotional techniques, al-
though very different in types used, were found to be important to the 
lawyers i.n both studies. The only difference seen here was in the type 
of techniques the different groups of lawyers chose to use~ 
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Vurthermore, the expected intermediary relationship was apparent in the 
:-;mal I town, ill though if WM>, IHl mcnt :toned above, completely reversed in 
1 ht• llnclings ot who acted as intermediaries, and to what extent for the 
various types of lawyers' practices. 
The question raised now is, "So what?" The proposed cosabining of· 
pro bono services with organized legal aid was the most i~~portant reason 
for exploring these relationships. From the findings of this report, 
can the two be compatably combined? This answer can only come frotn a 
fi.na 1 reexamination of both the institutionalized frameworks of the un-
organized and organized legal services delivery systems, and the in-
<"entlv'~ to maximize profits found aJDOng lawyers. 
lnstitut·ional differences between the two t'pes of legal delivery 
systems could most probably be,overcome the easi~st. The major differ-
ences were the institutionalization of economic problems on the one hand 
and of poverty-related problems on the other. In a combined systea, the 
private lawyrr still could not be expected to immediately institution-
alize poverty cases to become a lllOre competent pro bono lawyer. Front 
the studies in the urban area in contrast to the small town study pre-
sented in this paper, it seemed apparent that. if organized legal aid 
was available, the private lawyer would defer to the• the services not 
conwnon to their regular l'ractlees. When such services were not avail-
able, as in the small town study in Pittsburg County, the lawyers .. y 
have had more incentives to at least atte.,t to provide sa.e of the non-
institutionalized services the•selves. The extent to which theJ are 
ahle to provide these services that are not c~n to their practice, 
i.s st:l.l I ln question however. Even U organized legal aid opened up 
the use of its research institute and backup centers to urban lawyers, 
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llttle change! would be expected without the proper incentives. As it 
has been found to be throughout this paper, this incentive would prob-
·.ably be money. This would defeat the purpose of c011bining pro bono 
and organized legal aid. 
Another alternative might be to maximize lawyer use as it is. 
This would necessitate Legal Services Corporation prograllis incorporat-
ing pro bono.Services into their programs to do what they do naturally. 
This would mean having pro bono lawyers handle the more common legal 
·problems such as divorce and simple property 118tters. Legal aid might 
then concentrate its efforts 110re on the poverty-type issues it does 
best. A plan might be worked out to include those of .oderate means 
in such a system. Legal Services Corporation mi$ht act similarly to 
the pro bono private lawyer and charge a graduated fee based on what· 
I • 
the client could pay, as in low fee work. Since they wouldbe dealing 
with types of cases that private lawyers do not normally handle anyway, 
this might be a method to defer some of the expense of the prograas and 
allow for more services and advertising. In return for referrals from 
the t.ega 1 Services Corporation program offices on connonly institu- . 
tional issues, the participating lawyers •ight also be required to ad-
here to a fee based on ability of the c Uent to pay. This would help 
to provide legal assistance to those of 110derate means, and should also 
be ;a boon to the younger solo practit loner who would then be free to 
t;ake such a person as :t regular client if the situation ever arose. 
WHh an increase in generic advertising aaking 110re poor aware of 
their unrecognized legal prohle•s, 110re total clients should be served 
than under any variation of the current hit-or-t~iss type interMdiary 
system now in eff<'ct •. It would also ge.t around the problea of the 
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private lawyer advertising. 
The problems with such a system are in acceptance and enforce.ent. 
As was previously shown, lawyers have feared the rise of socialized law 
for many years. There is little indication that they would stop nov. 
One point in favor of the plan, however. is its voluntary nature. No 
lawyer would be coerced into joining, and it would favor SOlie lower in• 
come practice building lawyers considerably. Another fear to overco.e., 
however, would be to allow legal services programs to take fee gener-
ating cases, even in poverty-related areas. This would probably cause 
the loudest cry of socialism from. the conservative legal ranks. 
Enforcement of the fee schedules would also present a problea. 
llow. could an organized legal services program be sure the participating 
I 
Jawyer was actually abiding by'the pre-arranged fee based on inco.e? 
Two alternatives exist. One would be to randomly sample clients after 
they were referred. If he or she was overcharged, it could be grounds 
for ending the arrangement with the lawyer, fines. or for more constant 
scrutiny. The other alternative would be even less desirable. It 
would entail checking pri.vate lawyers' records or sending underc.over · 
legal aid officials pretending to be eligible clients. Neither of these 
would probably be acceptable to strongly independent private lawyers. 
Still nnother problem the cotabinaUon of organized legal aid and 
pro bono activity would have to face would be the disturbance of the· 
intermediary syste11. It was evident fro. the findings that lawyers do 
maximize returns from pro bono services. When the poor becOIIe 110re 
aware· of previous I y u•u·ecognf.zed prob le.S and the abi 1 ity to have the. 
solved by lawyers at no or reduced fees, the relationship aisht chanae 
from that of a privilege to that of a right of the poor. If suchdtd 
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occur, llw .1 ess-establ ished lawyers would be favored by increasing 
smaJ 1-f£>(~ busint!SS ;md by practice building when and if the poor COUld 
com<~ back as paying d ients. Jo'or the established firm attorney, how-
ever, the change might not be so fortuitous. They were seen in both 
the urban studies, rural studies, and the small town study to use legal 
servic£!S to pleasf~ int<~rmediarles· and fulfill societal expectations. 
If the servke to the client st~nt by the intermediaries was no longer 
seen as a favor, this relationship would be destroyed. The service 
would then b<.~ more likely to be channeled through a more neutral re-
terral of.fiet•, and seen as an obligation not as a self-imposed duty 
stirred by ties of friendship of favor. This would possibly force the 
more established firm attorneys into performing other types of promo-
1 
tional techniques to maintain their practice and fulfill social obli-
g:1ti.ons. 
The key sN~ms to lie in advertising. This is the only thing that 
could overcolll(> institutionaliz;ltlon, and its pursuant problems for the 
poor. lt would end nonrecognition of poverty problems. It would al-
low the poor to proteet themselves in n way little seen before. It 
would also change power orientations wlthin the conmunity. As was 
round in the community action programs of the 1960s, this would prob-
ah 1 y IJK>t•t with strong establishment opposition. 
Whitt: then ••re the alternatives? A system of aid to only the poor 
should h£~ feasible! und<~r such a plan, but even i.t is likely to be care-
ful in its advc!rl·i:;iug to avoid changing relationships bet\lleen laWyers 
and intermediaries. 1~his m.ight be :a workable syste• for a s.all town, 
however. lUther a:; a regularly staffed or as a satellite office, the 
organized legal aid person could be (~alled upon to serve poverty-issue 
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r,n)blt!ms .for tlw I ndigcmt. For inf;tltutionali~ed problems, H all the 
matt<~r requ'ired was advice, he or she might be able to handle this also. 
Then, for the institutionalized cases that required small aaounts of 
time, a referral could be made to participating lawyers who ·would agree 
before hand to treat the ellgible legal aid client on a no fee basts. 
incentives for private lawyers to join such a progra• would first in-
elude contacts that might act to build their practice sanae day if no 
restrictlons were made on later fee-based cases. Secondt this could be 
a way for lawyers to fulfil 1 social expectations. If a rotation list 
within t~:ect. •Jrea of specialization was used as a basis tor referral, 
tile tJrivatt• lawy<•r <~ould be called upon to perfo!'lll cases· in his or her 
;uea of spedalizatlon. An upward list of 5 to 15 cases per year c,otlld 
be plt!dged beforehand ensuring no over-whelming burdens. Finally, if 
t:he cas«~ dealt only with indigent:;, the provision of low fee services 
to those of riiodt!ral:«• means could also continue to be based on an in-
termediary system. This would maintain this relationship and its ad-
vantages for all lawyers--urban, sm."lll town, and rural.--who wish td 
pleasE! fri<mds, busin(•ss associates, or paying clients. 
AnolhE>t" advantage of such a system would be in its ability to 
sp_rf'ad the• services of or,~aniz(•d legal aid lawyers farther. No longer 
. would legal aid lawyers .be fort~ed to spread their services so thinly. 
This would h•aVf! 1110re free thtte for organized legal aid to deal with 
J»Ovt•rr:y are:ts ;end evt•n thE> neor(' c0111plc.~x cases in instttutionaliaed law. 
<!m;es th:tt requin•d f!XIM!'n!;ivt~, lent~dty appeals •fght be. worked on 
joint I y betwt'!en orgmihed and pro bono lawyers. Because of increased 
. . . . 
:tcli.vity in poverty-l:ew areas, the recognition by the poor of such 
:n·c·:es as legal !;hould l~~~prove. This also has an advantage over aasatve 
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publlc·it.y .-.nd infor~~~al::l.on campaigns because it would give the syatea 
time to adJust slowly, instead of being deluged with litigation all at 
once. 
This is the hope that can be fores~en in organized leaal services 
combining with unorganized pro bono delivery systems. If it is to be 
eHective or even possible, it must take into consideration underlyina 
incent-ives for lawyers to do pro bono services. If a system was 
structured ln such a way as to compliment these incentives,· to not 
bring on the fear of the private legal business not being overrun by 
the governnaent, and to not destroy a valuable intert~~ediary relationship 
for tfw lttwyers, t·ooperaUon could be forthcotllng. This c011prot11ise 
systmn se<~ms to hP the best system for getting maximum services to the 
I 
poor at minimum .costs. And, as opposed to WIOre idealistic systeas;. it 
should have a chance to work. 
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Pillsbt•tR (!ounty l,;awyer:: Survey, 1')79 
The questions asked to Pittsburg County lawyers are reproduced 
here directly as they were asked to the lawyer. The major difference 
is that the lawyers each.received one legal-sized sheet with the 
questions on both the front and back. 
l:t). So~~~e lawyers in towns like those in Pittsburg County say they do 
some no fee or Jow fee (NF/LF) work in civil cases for those in 
the cOMAUnity who cannot afford topay their normal fee, other 
lawyers say they do not do this type of service for various 
reasons. Which of the following would you say best describes 
your polic'.y on such NI~/LF work for the poor? 
I) T actively seek out such clients. 
2) I mn wU ling to he 1~ anyone who comes to me for such 
· he·]l). · 
3) l am willing to help someone who has been sent to me 
hy the Bar Association Referral Service. 
4) I am willing to help someone who has been sent to me 
by a person or a group I know, including the Bar Asso-
ciation Referral Service. 
';) I am not able to do such work. · 
lb). Answer only if answer above was "5". All others go 'to lc. 
Which of the following answe.rs best explains why you are unable 
to do NF/l.F work? 
l) !lave never been asked to. 
2) Fl rm won' t a 11 ow it. 
1) Must deal with paying customers to make ends meeto 
'•) A m<atter of principle. 
';) Otht•r (specify) 
k). Answer onlY H response to la was 1 through 4. If answere.d 5 on· 
Ia proceed to 4a. 
To the best :of your records or nae1110ry, what percentage of the 
NF/I .. F clients' problems you dealt with last year fell into each 
· of the following categories? 
I) Consumer and en~ploy111ent related 
---2) AdMinistrative problems __ _ 
3) Uousing probleMs 
4) <:tvll Liberties i_s_s_u_e_,s -,..--
~) Fa.ily/.arital problems-----
6) Property related __ _ 
7) Personal injury __ _ 
8) Other (specify) 
--------------------------·-------------· 
ltl). What" ,,.. .. ,.,.,,, wt~re: 1) Male 2) f'ema)e 
It•). Would you describe the typical NF/LF clients you served as: 
·l) Chronically poor; indigent 
2) Son~eone who has fallen on ·hard times 
.1) Other (Specify) 
If). Would you describe the typical NF/LF client as: 
Employed_ 
Temporarily employed 
Freque~t job jumbers 
Unemployed 
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2) 
3) 
4) 
5) Other (Specify) --------------------
Jg). Ol tlll'se NF/I~F clients, what typE> of legal effort did it take on 
your p<trt to dispense with their 'problems? What % of the cases 
i nvo l vecl: 
I) Adviec only 
2) Nt!J,~otiation 
1) Liti.gJatfon 
----4) ltef(!Tntl to a soc.ial services agency 
-:---7" ~) Referral to another lawyer specialized in that area 
(,) Adm i. ni st rat J ve hearings 
7) Otht:.•r (Spt~d fy) . 
--~------------~----------------------
lh). What is the major di!;tinction you make between free service at1d 
low fee service clients? 
2a). Sometimes tbe poor come to the lawyer on their own. Other 
times s0111eone else has defined their problems as legal and 
suggested they :;ee you personally, or the Lawyer Referral 
Service for NF/LF help. What % of the NF/LF clients you 
havt~ served had such an intermediary guide them to legal 
help as a solution of their problem? 
1) 
2) 
:J) 
Non<~ 
l to 25% __ 
25 to 50% 
4) 50 to 75% 
---5) 15 to loot __ 
6) My clients do not tell me. 
2h). How would you bt•st describe these people who refer NF/LF 
c I ients? 
I ) 
2) 
l) 
4) 
S) 
fo'rirmds/s•wial acquaintances Of yours 
Mcaal•t!rs of a r;oclal grou1• to which you belong ----
PuylnK clients of yours 
~--Friends or rel11tives of the poor client·~--
Workers in social we I. fare agencies (which ones) 
6) Otht~r (Spt~<:ify) 
2< ). 'l'ypic:;tl Jy. wla<tl i~• llw nat.un• ol the relationship between the 
cl tent .and the person who n•ferrcd him/her to you or the re-
ferral service? 
2d). · Wotlld you consider the rPlative socio-economic status of the 
average pet'son who, as an intermediary, refers NF/LF clients 
to :a lawyer as being? 
l) More like your own 
2) More like the NF/LF client 
J) Other (Specify) 
]a). nased on your experi c•ncc~, do NF /LF c 1 ients ever become regular 
paying c I Ients'! 
l) 
2) 
3) 
Always 
Ft·P.quent I y 
St•ldom 
4) 
5) 
6) 
Rarely __ _ 
Never 
Not sure 
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4:i). Some people have argued that the past ban on legal advertisement 
and procurm111.mt has led lawyers who wish to build a practice into 
suc:h activities as joining social organizations and/or running 
lor puhllc orf icc.• in ordt•r to become well known within the com-
munity. llavc you ever felt it would be tor the advantage of your 
,,rat:ticc to cmgagc! In any ot the following activities? (Recog-
nizing many could be pert·onned with both charitable and economic 
motives.) Please circle one or one's application. -
~) Ran for elective offire 
2) .Joined a businessmen's organization 
3) Gave thne to charitable organizations 
'•) tJee:JJD(! more active ln the church 
5) Gave time to frat<~rnal organizations 
~) Other (Spcci[y) 
7) No 
4b). Jf you answered "no" on 4a, why did your circumstances allow you 
to attract a clientele without such activities?. 
4(•). 
5a). 
Wh;tt c•ffc·c~t do you tMnk the changes· in the ban. on legal ·adver~ 
Using wil 1 havt' on the developiiM!nt of practices by new lawyers 
in this cOIIIhunity? (m'aything else?) 
. ' .. . 
What would you consider the Miljor differences are in practicing 
law ln a smaller clty/rural setting, as opposed to the large or 
very-brge urban setting. Please be specific. If you n9ed -ore. 
rooat ph•<HW attach extra sheets. 
';b). Un you fe,d tlw net,ds ol the poor for NF/LF legal service are 
diffcrt•nt in the smc1Uer urban/rural setting? Arc they more 
likt•ly oe· lr•ss likdy t.o lw met? 
142 
'ic). ln Pi 1 tsburg <:ounty, the needs of the poor for NF/LF service in 
c ivi J c;u;es are: 
l) Met Co111pletely 
2) · Met for the mos .... t-p-ar-t 
~J) Met only in the most s_c_r __ i o .... us matters __ _ 
4) Unmet -- need organized legal aid 
'J) Other (Specify) --
5d). Ple;ase rank the way you feel most of the poor deal with their 
problems in Pittsburg County. 
J) Oo nothing ____ _ 
2) Self-help __ 
J) Through Lawyer Referral for help _ 
'•) 1'hrough private lawyer for help ____ 
')) Non l etval methods 
---
.'le). What nonlegaJ methods· ar<~ used by the poor to solve legal prob-
lems? 
6a). Your age is 
------
6c). Ye;ar graduated from law school 
6d). •t'ypt! n[ t!nvironment ''you grew up in": 
3) Suburban 1 ) l.;argt~ urbnn 
2) Small urban 4) Rural 
6t•). Y(~:tr ht!gan pr:act ice ln J'ittsburg County 
(,f). t,ol H ic:a I 1\1 I iH;ition: (l) llelllC)crat 2) Independent 
]) Republ i'~'tn 4) Other 
6h). ArtHJ of profm>sion•tl speeiali.zation 
(l i ) • Jhmunl incoiiiC: 
I) 
2) 
"t) 
4) 
'i) 
$0 -- $15,000 .~~ 
$ p;.ool $25,000 _ 
$2'),001 -- $45,000 
$4';.001 ·- $S'l,OOO _----
$'i.'),OOJ and over 
---
--------a---------------~. 
f•j). Wnultl you cons'lch•r your ,,,·;wlln• to be: 
I) Solo 
---2) Partn<'rshi p 
J) Firm __ 
6k). What % of your overall practiee would you say deals with: 
1) 
2) 
'l) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
1\us i ness 
-Domestic Relations 
Constitutional Rights ____ _ 
Criminal 
No Fee/Low Fee 
---Real Estate 
Tax 
Patent 
Other (Specify) 
61). Approximate number of cJients served per year as No Fee ___ _ 
As l.ow Fee 
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April 9, 1979 
llc:~r f'ittsl>urg County Lawyer: 
. 1\s a p<art of my M;Jster '5 degree program here at Oklahoma State, 
I am writing a thesis exploring the nature of no fee and low fee Pro 
l.~ono acUvity in th(• Hmalll."r urban area. Much has been written about 
tlw larger e it h~s 1 Pro Rono and [ega 1 aid activities. Pro Bono re-
s«·an:lu•r::; al :;o have <'XitiRi ned the rural enviromM•nt 's affect on such · 
:u:tivity. At ,,rt•sc•nt. howtwer, the most seri.ous void in the literature 
is Ill{' l;u:k ol lntormatl.on :thoul the smaller city, not served bya 
l•!ga1 ;lid offtc:(•. 'f'lwrt•t.·or(!• nty interest centers around this area's 
t:lwr:f<:l.t•r i sl: ic.~s. 
I' itt sburg County was. :i<~ 1 «!C t.<!d because it fits the above de scrip-
t iun ;md because> nl my intt•resl .. in the area I grew up in. Results of 
tlu• s~arv«•y wi Jl be pre:;«:•nt(!d tQ the ;President of: the Pittsburg County 
nar 1\sso("i;ation, Mr~ "l\uddy" N~·aJ." 
The LinK• you Utk<• in filling out this one-page questi.onnaire will 
lw greatly :appr<•ciatec.J. The survt!y design attempts to take as little 
ol your time as possible. 1\lso, if you will leave the answered ques- · 
lions with your reccpt.ionlsl, I can collect it without inconveniencing 
you. 
Your partlcip;1tion in this survey is much appreciated. 
ltavt• any llli<'Stions, please (·onta<~t me at the address below, 
t.he Ptlliti<~al Sci<•ncP ll<'tJartment. 
Sincerely, 
L:wra Manning 
:ns South Ounc:an, Apt. 2 
Stlllwatt!r, OK 74074 
(40')) 377-0872 
If you 
or through 
'~-· 
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